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Preface
}
i
In response to a request from the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA), the National Research Council (NRC) as-
sembled a panel to review the meteorological support related to space
operations at the Kennedy Space Center (KSC). A copy of the ini-
tial NASA request is included in Appendix A. Specifically, the panel
was requested to review the requirements for meteorological informa-
tion at KSC and to prepare recommendations for NASA regarding
the feasibility, development, and implementation of a meteorologi-
cal facility at KSC that would (1) improve the quality, utility, and
reliability of meteorological information for planning and operations
and (2) provide a facility at which atmospheric scientists may pursue
short-term weather research to improve KSC operations.
In negotiations between NASA and the NRC, the scope of the
tMk was broadened slightly. It was agreed that the panel would "re-
view the state of scientific understanding of meteorological factors
relevant to space operations at KSC, including existing observa-
tion and forecast systems and the utilization of meteorological infor-
mation in decision making, identify potential improvements to the
present system at KSC in terms of NASA requirements, and make
specific recommendations for the development and implementation
vfi
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of improved systems to address NASA's research and operational
_i. goals.'*
_ This study is timely in that it follows the Space Shuttle Chal-
i _' lenger explosion on January 28, 1986, and the lightning-related de-struction of the Atlas-Centaur 87 rocket on March 28, 1987.
"_ _ With recent advancements in ways to probe the atmosphere
and the development of new avenues for processing, cormnunic _,t_ u
and interpreting meteorological information, much-improve .'_, _-
rological support for space operations should be possible. 5 "."_re?ort
reviews NASA's present program of meteorological suppor f_,_:_e
operations and offers suggestions for improvements.
The panel visited a number of sites during its study, t, ;.;..
period from August 31 to September 2, 1987, the panel visited the
Kennedy Space Center; on October 30, interviews were conducted
at NASA headquarters; and from December 1 to 3, 1987, the panel
visited Johnson Space Center. Other meetings of the panel focused
on the preparation of this report. A list of the persons who made
presentations to the panel or were interviewed by the panel is included
in Appendix B,
Although the study has been conducted for NASA, the panel has
recognized that the report is likely to be read not only by NASA ad-
ministrators and meteorological support personnel, but also by many
other people with varying familiarity with the space program. Even
among those working within the space program, there ere varying
degrees of familiarity with meteorological support operations. For
this reason, the panel felt it would be useful to include a cons_der-
able amount of background information to provide an overview of
the nature of meteorological support for space operations and the
organizational environment in which it exists.
The Executive Summery reviews the principal conclusions and
recommendations of the panel. Chapter 1 outlines the weather el_
ements that are important for space operations and the manner in
which they are critical. Chapter 2 contains an overview of the rrga-
nizatinnal structure of the weather support activities for the space
program. Chapter 3 reviewe the observational systems, and Chapter
4 suggests some possible technological upgrades for meteorological
analysis and forecasting operations in support of space operations.
*From the proposal written in response to NASA'I request for the NRC
panel,
viii
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Chapter 5 outlines an organizational framework that the panel be- :_!
lieves is needed to foster a vigorous and vital meteorological program ._
1j' in support of both manned and unmanned space flight, i;
I would like to thank the members of the panel for their consci- :_
entious attention to our deliberations. Each member attended all of
_ the panel meetings and contributed significantly in the preparation
of the text. Iwould like to acknowledge the role of Gregory S. Forbes,
_i who assembled and reassembled the many drafts of the report. In ad-
': dition, special thanks go to Karen Poniatowski and Arlene Peterson
il of the NASA Office of Space Flight for their assistance.
Charles L. Hosler, Chairman
_' Panel on Meteorological Support
:_' for Space Operations
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Executive ummary
Remote sensing and computer technologies have developed to
the point where great new advances in real-time weather observing
and forecasting are po_ible. An opportunity exists to make all
phases of the manned and unmanned space progranm more efficient,
less threatened by delay, and free of weather-related hazards that
could lead to damage or Ices of spacecraft or even human fives. It is
vital to make improvements within the meteorological support and
launch decision infrastructure of NASA that may avert a repetition
of tragedies such as the Atlaz-Centaur 67 destruction on March 26,
1987, and the Space Shuttle CJidienger explosion on January 28,
1986.
This report recommends mechanisms by which NASA can put
into operation state-of-the-acience meteorological technology and ad-
vanced weather forecastin_ techniques to enhance the efficiency, re-
liability, and ssfety of space operations. The spirit motivating these
recommendations is the panel's belief that NASA should strive to
exploit the benefits of the cutting edge of new meteorological tech-
nology, just as it exploits the potential of the numerous other tech-
nologies that support space flight. In strivin_ to reach this goal,
NASA can pave the way for many other applications of these ad-
vanced meteorological capabilities.
I
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2Since the inception of the shuttle program, the needs for mete-
orological support have become dearer and the quality of the me.
teorological support available has improved. However, it became
obvious to all members of the panel early in this study that NASA
has not had a coordinated meteorological support program. Owing
f to this lack of coordination, space program needs and meteorological
expertise have not yet been adequately brought together.
I The need for a coordinated and hnproved weather support pro-
I gram has already been expressed by others within NASA. In October
1986, the NASA Space Shuttle Weather Forecasting Advisory Panel
(John Theon, chairman) issued its findings and recommendations
to the NASA associate administrator for space flight. Their first
and foremost recommendation was that "Shuttle weather services
must be organized in such a way to bring them up to the very best
state-of-the-science and technology and under an optimal manage-
ment situation, m Toward this end, they recommended that "NASA
should establish a Weather Support Office at the top level of Shuttle
operations to plan, organize, focus, and direct the activities related
to Space Shuttle weather support? The Panel on Meteorological
Support for Space Operations endorses this recommendation. (All
recommendations from the Theon report are reproduced in Appendix
C of this report.) In the report that follows, the panel amplifies some
of these earlier findings and adds additional recommendations.
The task of reorganisation will not be simple. Meteorological
support for space operations is at present fragmented. The U.S.
A/r Force Air Weather Service provides observing and forecasting
personnel at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), Vandenberg AFB, and
Edwards AFB. NOAA provides support to Johnson Space Center
(JSC). A private meteorological firm provides forecasting service for
the Wallops Island, Virginia, Flight Facility. The Marshall Space
Flight Center (MSFC) provides some technical guidance to both
KSC and JSC, and other groups are also involved, including con-
tractors. The various participants report to different organizations
within NASA.
Following the Theon report and the formation of this panel,
a Weather Support O_ce (WSO) was created within the OlBce
of Space Flight (OSF), and on Deceml, er b, 1987, a director was
appointed. To bring about substantial improvements in weather
support, it is now imperative that NASA give clear and tmambiga.
cue au_Aority to the WSO, and grant it sufficient budget authority to
1989004487-015
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_i ensure an integrated and coordinated meteorological support pro-gram for all ground, launch, landing, and recovery activities. Weatlter
4rapport_'ermanned end unmamnedapacefligAt ,Aou/d bea _ngle co-
/tee/usprogram coordinated _rouglt _e Weatlter Support O_-tce.
_: This panel urges that all possible support be directed to this _ !
i. vital aspect of space operations. There are many good scientists and
technicians involved in meteorological research and support activities i
within NASA, but they are not sufficiently focused on the operational
problems of space flight. Each of NASA's research centers should be
i strongly encouraged to commit some of its resources in the effort to
upgrade meteorological support for the space program.
Although Air Weather Service and National Weather Service
forecasters have been supporting space operations with skill and ded-
ication, the technology and techniques they have employed up to this
time are not adequate to meet unique and stringent future require-
meats. Up to this point in the space program, launches have been
relatively infrequent and delays have been accommodated. Thus it
has, in principle, been possible to wait until ordinary meteorologi-
cad otmervations have indicated an ideal launch window. However,
there remains the concern that conventional techniques might fail to
detect certain hazards. As launches are _.heduled more frequently,
delays will become less tolerable. There will be a need to identify a
greater number of low-risk launch windows. This task requires im-
proved observations and predictions of many special meteorological
variables and phenomena of unique significance to space launches---
e.g., triggered lightning, precipitation size and type, wind shear, and
turbulence--with a d_gree of sensitivity, timeliness, and accuracy
unique to the space program.
The panel offers the following recommendations so that as the
space program moves into a revitalized era, space program personnel
may use meteorological information with confidence during all phases
of space operations. Recommendations are spelled out in greater
detail in subsequent chapters, where expanded justification rationale
is also given.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The panel identified five principal categories of deficiencies in the
program of weather support for space operations:
I. Quantification of weather hazards.
1gF .qNn44 7_nI R
!
! 2. Observing systems capable of detecting specific weather haz-
_ ardso
_ 2. Analysis and forecasting schemes for specific weather haz-
ards.
4. Coordination of applications research and operational pro-
grams.
5. Organizational structure to promote continued improvement
of weather support as needs chs_ge and capabilities improve.
A chapter in the report has been devoted to each of these prin-
_ cipal deficiencies (although not exactly in the sequence presented
: here). The key recommendations addressing each of these problems
are presented below. Additional observations and conclusions are
_ highlighted within the chapters of the text.
Reconnnendatlon 1: With expectatkm of mere frequent
launches and an associated decrease In the margin of weather
safety, it is huperative that NASA quantif7 nmre, ri_cwousl7
the relationships between magnitudes of weath_ _riables
and the huardB they po_ to space ve]'tdu. _ ght rules and
launch commit criteria should be based msthes_ relationships.
Many of the meteorological variables critically e_ecting space
operations have not been adequately quantified to the point where
weather support can be focused on specific threshold values. At
the same time, Space Shuttle program managers have not defined
precisely what weather information is needed. Thus the weather
support system has not been able to concentrate sufficiently on the
special problems of the Space Shuttle. Some critical parameters are
currently not measured--such as drop sizes in clouds and rain, which
are hazardous because of the possibility of protective tile damage--
and there is no program to initiate these types of measurements. At
the time when the Atlas-Centaur spacecraft was destroyed, NASA
and the Air Weather Service were operating the largest network of
electric field mills in the world, but measurements of electric fields
had not yet been incorporated into the weather commit criteria as a
guard against triggered l.ightning. Wind shear and turbulence criteria
are also not quantitatively defined.
Recommendation 2: New and Improved tnstrumentatlm,
must be used to detect weather conditions and phenomena
that are hazardous to space operatlons.
1989004487-017
1Many of the weather elements most critical to space operations
_! are not being measured directly. Their existence is being inferred
through relationships with other, directly observable, parameters.
_il For example, lightning strikes in clouds, and the electric fields that
_ provide a potential for triggered lightning in clouds, are inferred
from surface-based electric field readings. Lannch-time wind and
wind shear hazards are estimated by using soundings prior to launch
_ in conjunction with climatological statistics expectedof short-term
_ wind variance. These types of indirect hazard assessments are ac-
ceptable when no other options are available, but when more direct
measurement systems are available they should be used.
Displays from additional existing lightning detection networks
should be made available in the KSC weather forecast office, and a
%
new system should be developed to detect/n-cloud lightning. Instru-
mented aircraft should be used to measure electric fields *]oft that
!! could lead to triggered lightning and to measure the types and sizes
of pl_cipitation that could damage the Space Shuttle. Multiparame-
ter radar and ground-based disdrometers should be used to examine
the temporal and spatial variability of precipitation ty_e and size. A
network of wind profilers should be used to detect rapidly changing
patterns of wind and wind shears or to ensure their nonexistence.
Several Doppler radars should be deployed to detect probable areas
of wind shear and turbulence and to identify low-level wind conver-
gence zones in which thunderstorms are likely to form.
Alternative landing sites overseas have. until now, been equipped
only w_th rudimentary instrumentation _nd have, in some cases,
relied on local observers. These sites should be surveyed to ensure
the availability of adequate weather observations for safe recovery.
Reconnmndatlon 3: A number of emerging techniques for
weather analysis and forecasting and decision making must
be actively pursued.
The introduction of new instrumentation should immediately
improve detection capabilities, but it wil! not necessarily ensure im-
provements in weather forecasts. Pre_ent weather forecasting tech-
niques have been developed for use with the types of data previously
available and will ._eed to be modified _o incorporate new data bases.
Improvements in knowledge of the qu_.ntitative relationships between
weather elements and space flight risk will necessitate a fine-tuning
of weather forecasts to accurately predict spec!a_ values of particular
v:eather variables.
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Techniques to be developed include a local weather analysisf system, an interactive computer-aided decision-making system, and
_ nested grid numerical weather prediction models.
Reccmm_datl_ 4: To _ about ,m_t_lai impr_e.
merits in weather support, it is hnperatlve that NASA glve
dear and unambiguous authority to the Weather Support
Office and give it sufficient budgetary authority to ensure an
integrated and coordinated meteorological support program
for all phases of the manned and unmanned space programs.
It has been made clear by the Theon report, and in all of the 1
presentations heard by this panel, that the organizational structure of
NASA has inhibited an integrated and coordinated weather support
program that would focus NASA's considerable technological and
human resources and expertise on NASA's operational space flight
problems. The primary mission of the WSO should be to mobilize
and coordinate ss many of these resources as possible toward one
objective: to develop and implement new techno]ogiss for observing,
analyzing, and forecasting the weather elements most critical to the
space program. In the context of this report, WSO should serve as
the administrative office charged with ensuring the execution of the
other recommendations.
Recommendation $: An Applied Research and l_orecasting
Facility (ARFF) should be established at Kennedy Space
Center to promote the development and application of new
measurement technology and new weather analysis and fore-
casting techniques to improve weather support for spaceop-
erations, to provide forecaster education and training, to
coordinate field program. Involving the meteorological com-
nmnity, and to conduct an active visiting scientist program.
The paramount function of the Air Weather Service detachment
at the Cape Canaveral Forecast Facility, which services KSC and the
NOAA group at JSC, is to provide operational weather support on a
daily basis for the many launches and ground activities in progress.
Neither group has a mission to conduct research, and they are not
adequately staffed to coordinate new programs to develop and install
advanced instrumente.tion and new techniques for weather analysis
and forecastin; at KSC. However, the unique weather sensitivities of
the space program dictate that new observing systems are required
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in order to improve the quality of weather support. A great deal of
effort is required to develop procedures for using these systems to
improve operational weather analysis and forecasting and to train
operational weather forecasters to use these procedures. Thus an
ARFF is needed to help the WSO in the mission of developing new
observing, analysis, and forecasting technologies. This assistance
should include the special tasks of determining how best to use
the technologies in the KSC environment and of transferring the
technology to the operational forecast offices. These tasks should
employ an experimental weather forecasting facility within ARFF
where new techniques can be teated and operational forecasters can
_i be stationed for training. An advisory committee should be formed
_ to assess _'orWSO the ongoing efforts to improve weather support
_ and to suggest additional or alternative approaches.
_ CONCLUDING REMARKS
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration has been
poorly organized to provide weather support, and the result is a sys-
tem that is !ees than state-of-the-science. Unless radical changes are
made now in the way services and applied research are coordinated,
weather will loom larger as a threat to a rejuvenated and accelerated
space flight program. To make available greater numbers of safe
launch and recovery windows and to provide a more complete recog-
nition of hazards that are at present poorly observed and predicted,
a larger, more comprehensive, and better integrated program will be
required. This program will require rapid technology and _echnique
development, testing, and transfer to operational status.
The panel believes that, in order to maximize the safety of
launches of manned and unmanned vehicles and landings of the Space
Shuttle, the space program most critically needs current weather in-
formation and forecasts valid for 2 hours or less. The quality of the
latter very-short-term forecasts (or Unowcasts_) is often, in reality,
limited by the quality of the observations. Accordingly, the panel
places the highest priorities on the improvement of existing observ-
ing systems and on the deployment of new measurement systems.
Further, these actions can yield almost immediate improvements in
weather support. Observations of lightning, electric fields aloft (in
order to identify nonelectrified clouds that are safe to penetrate), and
rapid wind variations are most urgently needed. The pal . advocates
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!: implementation of the following actions as rapidly as possible: in- '
strumenting an aircraft to measure electric fields aloft, wind velocity,
' and turbulence along the launch/landing paths; installing a single ,
wind profiler to detect sudden wind changes; and installing displays
of additional lightning detection networks in the weather office to
monitor thunderstorm systems approaching the KSC area. The de-
velopment of forecasting techniques can follow, and benefit from, the
new instrumentation.
Because of its high visibility, the space program is a critical
focal point from which the public, the national and international i
scientific communities, and the nation's decision makers derive their
perceptions of the scientific, engineering, and technological expertise
in the United States. It is incumbent on all scientists and engineers
to be sure that the best technology and expertise are utilized to
ensure the success of the program.
i
i
i
1989004487-021
_',:_ _. _ , . _ • ,: - ,_, ., . ,_r;_r_/ _rr_r/._w_re,__Te_. _
Sensitivity of the Space Program to
Weather ElementsI
On November 14, 1969, the Apollo 12 space vehicle was launched
from complex 39A at the NASA Kennedy Space Center (KSC),
Florida. At 36.5 seconds into the flight, and again at 52 seconds,
major atmospheric electrical disturbances occurred that were subse-
quently attributed to vehicle-triggered lightning. Temporary disrup-
tions of normal operations included the loes of attitude reference by
the inertial platform in the spacecraft, illumination of many warning
lights and alarms in the crew compartment, disconnection of the
electronic circuitry to three fuel cells, loss of communication, and
disturbances to the timing system, clocks, and other instrumenta-
tion. Nine nonessential instrument sensors with solid-state circuits
were permanently damaged. It was most fortunate that the triggered
lightning damage did not have disastrous consequences.
On March 26, 1987, an Atlas-Centaur unmanned vehicle was
launched from pad 36B at Cape Canaveral .Mr Force Station. The
weather conditions were similar to those present at the time of Apollo
12, and this time the outcome was calamitous. At 16:22:49 EST,
about 48 seconds after liftoff, the vehicle initiated a four-stroke light-
ning flash to ground. This discharge caused a memory disruption
in the vehicle guidance system that, in turn, initiated an unplanned
yaw maneuver. The resulting exaggerated angle of attack produced
stresses that caused the vehicle to break apart. About 70 seconds
1989004487-022
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after liftoff, the range safety officer ordered that the Atlas-Centaur be
destroyed, in order to protect those below from large falling debris.
Both of these events illustrate that triggered lightning is cur-
rently one of the major forecasting problems at KSC. This threat
may have already caused NASA managers to adopt an attitude of
overconservatism to the extent that almost any cloud overhead may
now merit the delay of a launch. Thus it is also important to know
when clouds are benign and safe to fly through. There are also other
weather phenomena (such as wind, wind shear, and precipitation)
that may be hazards and that at present are not being observed or
forecast adequately.
Space vehicle encounters with adverse weather conditions have
been quite limited over the 30_year history of the space program,
owing to a judicious selection of launch days, landing sites that
usually favor benign weather environments, and the relatively short
periods of time when the flight is in the weather-bearing layers of the
atmosphere. The accumulated Uexposure" time, e.mounting to a few
minutes during each launch and up to an hour on manned reentry
and landing, makes the total base of weather experience a few days at
most. Until recent years, this limited weather experience had led to a
belief that weather was of secondary importance in space operations.
The panel hopes this perception no longer prevails.
Meteorologists realize that the space program has been relatively
lucky with respect to weather hazards. Research in the last decade
has revealed the occasional existence of various small-scale weather
phenomena that could be dangerous to space flight, but often cannot
be observed or forecast with existing operational instrumentation and
techniques. The previous absence of encounters with these features
over KSC has been partly a matter of chance. In view of recent
temperature effects on O-rings and triggered lightning strikes, our
run of good luck may have ended. Good luck need not be a requisite
for acceptable space flight weather. :t is the opinion of the panel
that, with the introduction of new and upgraded observing, analysis,
and forecasting tools, critical weather variables can be observed and
launch conditions successfully predicted.
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
If we reflect on the magnitude of the problem faced by the pio-
neers of space exploration and the history of the space program, it is
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i ,1 Iunderstandable that, when faced with the need to develop unprece.
I dented mechanical, control, and communications systems, wea_,her
was not considered a high-priority problem. Prior to late 1987, no of-
i rice was designated to coordinate weather-related operational needs, :_es arch, and related issues.
As entry into space has become more common, the character
_ of the space program has changed in that the emphasis is turning
_= to frequent launches, economical operations, reusable vehicles, and _;
manned missions. These trends have increased the sensitivity of the !
space program to weather.
If the space program progresses into the 1990s as planned, two
points are certain: (1) space flight will be more frequent, with delays
and cancellations more intolerable and costly, and, as a result (2)
encounters with potentially hazardous weather environments will be
more frequent.
With more frequent launches and an expected decrease in
the weather safety margin, It is imperative that NASA (I)
more rigorously deHne the effects of weather on the space
program and (2) take steps to upgrade its weather observing
and forecasting program into a state-of-the-science system
tuned to serve in this new era in space fllght--a system that
can confidently and reliably Identify huards as well as define
launch windows with a high degree of weather safety.
Historically, NASA has dealt with weather-related problems (1)
by avoiding recognizable hazardous weather situations, (2) by re-
ducing the sensitivity of the space vehicle systems to the weather
("system hardening"), and (3) by examining ways to change the
weather. The panel certainly endorses further hardening of space-
craft systems. The Apollo 12 and Atlas-Centaur accidents have
clearly demonstrated the vulnerability of spacecraft electronics to
triggered lightning. A similar experience by NASA astronauts fly-
ing a NASA T-38A on February 24, 1987, in wintertime stratiform
clouds near Los Alarnitos Army Aviation Facility, California, shows i
that triggered lightning is pervasive.
Since the avoidance and hardening options have practical limits
that fall short of ensuring total weather Uimmunity" and since mod-
ification of the weather does not appear to be practical at this time,
the panel advocates improving weather observing and forecasting
capabilities. Fortunately, bold initiatives are nothing extraordinary
for the space program, and there is already evidence that NASA and
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_: the cooperating agencies are taking steps to improve meteorok,gic_,l
In the remainder of this chapter the panel will lay the foundation
for the future weather system by assessing the impact of numerous
weather elements on various aspects of space operations. This will
also provide the background for the subsequent chapters, which will !
_!!= map a strategy for implementing an effective, state-of-the-science
!: weather observing and forecast;ng system.
WEATHER FACTORS IMPORTANT FOR
SPACE OPERATIONS
Weather elements influence all phases of space operations, from
mission planning through actual launch, booster rocket recovery (in
the case of the Space Shuttle), and landing. Weather information is
needed on time scales ranging from seasonal averages to seconds and
spatial scales ranging from global size to meters. Each phase of the
space program has weather sensitivities, some of which are described
below.
_ Mlulon Planning
i
Years in advance of launch, space vehicles are designed and
configured based upon climatological factors such as wind and tem-
perature. Climatological wind profile statistics, which indicate the
range of stresses that the vehicle is likely to encounter, are used in
determining payload limits, flight trajectories, fuel requirements, and
crew configuration. Other factor_ can influence the season or even
the time of day scheduled for launch.
Ground Operations
Ground activities are sensiti_'e to a number of weather phi-
nomena. The temperature and wind profiles are critical factors in
determining the hazards from fueling accidents because they deter-
mine the concentrations and trajectories of released gases. Activities
involving toxic substances are curtailed when the resultant plume
would threaten workers or a nearby population. Activities are also
curtailed during the presence of nearby lightning or strong inversions
(layers of air in which temperature increases with height) that could
focus sound energy from explosions and cause window breakage.
I
i
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i _: "IYsnsport of equipment to and from the launch pads is curtaile_!during precipitation, lightning, atrong winds, and blowing sand or :
_ dust. Fueling or detanking, as well as work on scaffolds, is halted by
_ nearby lightning or wir_ds exceeding 35 knots. Precautions must be _:
taken for static electricity discharges during periods of low humidity.
Launch
Weather hazards encountered during launch can jeopardize the
safety of the entire mission: launch pt_], spacecraft, payload, and
crew. Extended periods of low temperatures can inhibit the oper-
ation of come essential components. For example, temperatures on
January 28, 1986, which were far colder than during any previous
shuttle launch, have been determined to have contributed to the
failure of the O-rings that led to the Challenger accident.* Stres_as
(wind loads) oL _ructura] members of the spacecraft that deviate
significantly from those anticipated during planning stages (from cli-
' matological data) could cause the vehicle to deviate from course or
break apart. Aerodynamic loads, from wind shears comparable to
the largest previously encountered during launch and from vehicle
response maneuvers, may have contributed to the final failure of the
O-ring seals.** P_ecipitation drop impact during flight can damage
heat-insulating tiles on the exterior of the Space Shuttle vehicle.
A direct lightning strike can damage the exterior of the space
vehi_:]e or the ezternal ta,k of the shuttle. A nearby or direct strike
_.m cause da,-nage to the digitally controlled flight systems and other
instrumentation, and even cause uncontrolled ignition of fuel. Both
naturaJ and triggered lightning are safety threats. Common cumu-
lonimbus clouds and their anvils and deep nonconvective clouds can
pose a threat of triggered lightning.
In order to avoid hazardous situations, weather is periodically
reviewed during the countdown prior to launch. Weather conditions
must meet stated criteria in order for the launch to proceed. If
necessary, a launch can be delayed or postponed at any time until
seconds before liftoff. The specific lists of weather launch criteria and
flight rules have been under revision during the past several years,
"Report ojrthe Preddent/a/Commi,ador,on the SpaceShuttleCh_/engerAccident,
June 6, 1986, pp. 70-72.
"'ibid.
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with extra safety margins added to address the lightning threat and
other huards. The proposed launch coraL.it criteria and flight rules
are included as Appendix D.
 eutry andIudtng
Landing operatiorm include "not_ud" landings of the Space Shut-
tle involving reentry and end of mission (EOM), end %bnormal_
landings, includ;ng missions aborted during ascent (return to hmnch
site (RTLS)), _n_Atlantic landings (TAL), and abort once _und
(AOA) maneuvers. Unlike the ground and launch procedures, which
can be delayed and resumed when conditions improve, the landing
procedure, once begun, is irreversible. Thus the final weather deci-
sion and site selection must be made at least 90 minutes before the
vehicle is due to land. Complicating the situation is that landing is
the most sensitive phase of the space flight mission.
In the landing phase, all of the weather factors discussed with
respect to launches are again important. In addition, man_ ?revi-
ously unimportant weather conditions become critical becan_e the
spacecraft may be piloted visually below 8000 feet. Low clouds and
fog, haze or other soltrces of low visibility directly affect the suit-
ability of sites for lending. These constraints present a significant
susceptibility to even weak weather systems. Because the spacecraft
has limited control capability during this stage, clear-air turbulence,
or strong headwinds or crosswinds, can present d,.'tticulties. More
obvious weather threats such as thunderstorm-related wind shears
and lightning present an even greater risk to the spacecraft during
the landing phase.
Rescue and Recovery at Sea
Booster rockets from the Space Shuttle normally fall into the
sea and are recovered by ship. Observations or forecasts of adverse
weather in the recovery region, such as high winds, low visibility,
thunderstorms, or high sea conditions, would affect the launch deci-
sions.
Postlanding Procedures
The landing does not end the weatLer threat to the spacecraft
or space program personnel. In loading the orbiter onto the Shuttle
Carrier Aircraft (SCA) and readying the SCA for transport, the
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if orbiter may be exposed to weather elements for a number of days.
i_ High winds, sandstorms, lightning, and precipitation can produce i
_ damage. Wind sensitivity is maximised while the orbiter is installed
_ piggyback onto the SCA.
_ The SCA flight itself can be dangerous. Flights are limited to
_ daylight hours at low altitudes, maximizing potential interaction
i with thunderstorms and turbulence.
_ Quantified Hazards from Weather F,lements
i_: As discussed previously, there are launch criteria and flight rules
_ for a number of weather variables. It was very difficult, and perhaps
} beyond the scope of this panel's task, to determine how much data
had been collected on the response of the shuttle (or other) vehi-
i cle in a range of possible values ,)f some of these parameters (e.g.,
precipitation types and sizes). Many of the weather elements are
potentially disastrous to space flight, and the extent of the danger
should be quantified as exactly as possible.
Unfortunately, it appeared to the panel that there is only crude
quantitative data regarding the risk posed by some weather hazards,
such as the values of cloud electric fields that are capable of pro-
ducing spacecraft-triggered lightning. One dangerous byproduct of
inadequate information on weather element-risk relationships may be
a tendency for the launch director to issue waivers of launch criteria
when conditions seem to be marginal; on average, two waivers have
been issued for each shuttle launch to date. It would be far better to
base decisions on the analysis of a complete data base.
New launch and landing weather flight rules have been de-
veloped that effectively prevent launch or landing if there is any
thunderstorm-produced cloud nearby. The pane! is concerned that
the implementation of overcautious flight rules will so constrain the
opportunities for launch that the launch director will ultimately have
no choice except to issue waivers. The development of quantified
weather element-risk relationships advocated above would provide
the best bask from which to define launch criteria and flight rules.
Only through use of these relationships can optimum flight rules be
attained, balancing the need to launch (i.e., the acceptable risk),
th: need for safety, and the extent of risk posed by a given weather
situation.
A review should be conducted to determine whether or not
the detailed responses of the Space Shuttle and other space
t-
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velddes to expected ranges of meteorological parameters are
_i known and are aecunte. The results of well-posed studies _':_
should be qumstined and published and _ as the bask for ,_
i-i launch conunlt criteria. _,
_ If the review shows that previous studies ofweather huards _
_- have been Inadequate, then new data should be collected tc i
_ quantify the chances of vehicle damage and/ca" a catastrophe
as a function of the observed values of various meteorological _
parameters and their thn_space distributions.
In some cases existing data bases are not adequate to estab- !
lish appropriate flight rules. An example of a phenomenon where
additional data are needed is lightning triggered within and near
the clouds produced by distant thunderstorms. In order to make i
real-time launch decisions, data are needed to show the probability
of triggered lightning as a function of distance to the parent thun-
derstorm, in combination with surface and airborne electric field
measurements and other parameters that can be observed.
CLIMATOLOGY OP CRITICAL WEATHER ELEMENTS
Climatological data can provide important guidance in schedul-
ing activities to minimize weather hazards. For example, Figure 1,
a graph of the number of lightning strokes as a function of time of
day, reveals that threats from natural lightning could be minimized
by scheduling launches only between 0300 and 1500 UT (10:00 p.m.
and 10:00 a.m. EST).
New climatological data bases are needed for weather elements
used in the newly revised flight rules and launch criteria. Most of the
data needed for au effective climatology of this type do not yet exist
and require obtaining data sets from new sensors. Among the data
needed are the types and sizes of precipitation elements in various
kinds of clouds, the electrical fields within and near detached anvils
and a variety of other cloud types, the electric fields that are required
to produce triggered lightning, and the magnitude of wind variations
on a variety of time scales. The sensors that may be _sed to collect
thesedata bLsesare discussedinChapter 3.
As the extent of new weather hazards Is quantified, and as
new launch cr|terla and flight rules are established, climato-
logical data bases should be generated that show their sea-
sonal and diurnal frequencies. It is clear that data bases
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FIGURE 1 Variations in the number of summer lightning dischlrges as I
function of time of day. The dashed plot represents the cumulative number of
lightning flashes detected over the Eastern Test .Range (ETR) using the field
mill network (Launch Pad Lightning Warning System (LPLWS)) during the
summers of 1976 to 1980. The solid plot represents the cumulative number of
llgl_tuing flashes detected over southern Florida using the Lightning Location
and Protection System (LLP) from June 15 to August 31, 1978. Data were
tabulated in 10-minute intervak. (From Miler, L.M., E.P. Krlder, and M.W.
Miler. 1984. Average diurnal variation of summer lightning over the Florida
Peninsula. Mort. W_r Rev. 11£:1134-1140.)
are needed that characterisethe U'_ered lightning hasard,
e]ectr|¢ fleldBwithin and near a wt.--4etTof cloud types, ])re-
clpltatlon types and sises, and short-termwind _wlabHlty.
One existing clim_,tological data base may need expansion. The
present use of winds in the loads program hu some inherent limita-
tions. Wind variability statistics invoked in determining the likeli-
hood of hazardous loads on the spacecraft ("knockdown loads _) are
based upon pairs ofjimsphere wind profiles obtained about 3.5 hours
and 1.7 hours apart. (The jimsphere is a roughened balloon designed
)
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FIGURE 2 Time-helght motion of wind spmcls (knots) obtLined from hourly
wind profilerdst._ st Peauylv-uis State Universityon Juusry 19-20, 1987. The
stippling indicstu s 100-knotchange of wind speed in 2 hours. For comparison,
tim indicated m the times of twlce-dLily NstlonLl WeMherService r_winsonde
launches at sites Icro_ the United States. The latter obeerwtions, taken about
400 km and 12 houm apart, can sully miss significant atmospheric fnturu.
(Courtesy of G. Forbes, Pennsylvtnin State Univer,lty.)
to respond rapidly to wind changes.) Pairs are pooled by season, and
sample sizes range from 37 to 65.
The panel is concerned that the jimsphere-pair sample is biased
toward fair weather days in general, and to warm days during the
winter season, the types of days most typically used for launches in
the past. Sharp, dangerous jet streaks, relatively small (500 to 1000
km) wedges of high wind speeds with strong vertical shears, such
as illustrated in Figure 2, are typically associated with disturbed
weather and may not have been adequately represented in a sample
biased toward warm, fair weather occasions.
An accelerated launch schedule will tend to require launches on
some less-than-perfect occasions, and tk-_ present jirosphere pairs
underestimate the wind shear hazard on those types of days. The
k
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winter season is likely to bear the brunt of the heightened schedule,
_ as thunderstorms, their rapidly changing weather, and the associated
_" forecasting difficulties make it di_icult to increase the pace during i
_ the warm season. The jimsphere pair data base should be expanded ,_
during the winter season to include all types of days that meet the
_,: other weather criteria for launch. It is especially critics] that the
data base include cases of clear skies immediately following cold _
front passage, where strong turbulent jet streaks are often found.
The jtmsphm_-pak data base should be expanded, ewpeclally
r" during the winter seasen, and should be supplemented by 7
wlnd proAl_ data. 4
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2ll Organization of Weather Support Services !
;
i
1
:!
Weather-related activities in support of space operations are
conducted within a complex web of agency infrastructure. Several i
government agencies have responsibilities for operational weather
observing and forecasting, among them the United States Air Force
Air Weather Service (USAF/AWS), the National Weather Service/
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NWS/NOAA),
and the United States Army Atmospheric Sciences Laboratory
(White Sands, New Mexico). Private contractors are also used to
take observations at Kennedy Space Center (KSC), and NASA per-
sonnel at KSC provide support services. The U.S. Naval Oceanog-
raphy Command has responsibility for operational forecasts of sea
conditions for recovery and rescue operations. Meteorological re-
search is done in a number of laboratories within the Air Force,
NOAA, and NASA, and by university and private contractors.
The functional and fiscal hierarchies of meteorological support
within these agencies are complex. Even though all of the agencies
are funded by the same federal government and are working toward a
common goal of excellence in providing weather services in support of
space flight, in practice this does not ensure a well-coordinated effort.
Many activities have evolved within individual subprograms of the
organizational web, but, in the absence of an overall plan, serious
gaps remain. The most fundamental conclusion of this report is that
2O
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_,_ meteorological research and operational support activities within the
U.S. space program are not well coordinated.
i The panel is not alone in reaching this conclusion, as this view I
was expressed to us at the operational level within each of the weather
_ support age cies. These p ople know what needs to be done, but lack !
responsibility or or manpower resourcesthe line financial to do it.
I There must be significantly better overall organisation of the various
_ weather-related activities in support of space flight, iNASA's Office of Space Flight (OSF) bears the responsibility •
for the construction, l_.unch, control, and recovery of NASA's space
! vehicles. Within OSF there are separate programs for manned (No,- i_
tional Space Transportation System, NSTS) and unmanned (ULV;
or expendable, ELV) space flight, having common as well as unique
: weather sensitivities. In order to coordinate the weather-related
i activities for both manned and unmanned space vehicles, strong or-
ganisational control must come from an office that has responsibility
for both manned and unmanned space flight, l'-n advisory committee
: described in Chapter 5 may facilitate the intragency coordination.
The Weather Support Office (WSO) was created within the Of-
riceof Space Flight late in 1987 and has the responsibility for creating
a more organised program of meteorological support. Although the
WSO is shown within the manned space flight chain of command
in Figure 3, it is important that all other segments of the Office of
Space Flight coordinate their requirements for meteorological sup-
port through the WSO.
To facilitate the organlsatlcmal procedure, everyone involved
in meteorological support for space flight must recognise that
the Weather Support Office has respmls|billtT for directing,
coordinating, and supervising the operational and applied
research activities in support of both manned and unmanned
spaceflight.
The director of WSO should seek to mobilize the wealth of tal-
ent and facilities within NASA, USAF/AWS, NOAA/NWS,
and other government agencies and universities to address
weather support .9roblems.
The Weather Support Office must obtain a budget and exer-
cise line-item anthe_lty to support and direct applied research
efforts needed to solve operational weather problems.
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FIGURE 3 Schemat_ diagram dep_tlng the portion of the NASA OSF or-
ganlzat|onal hierarchy that k most concerned with weather support activitiu.
Many add_ionai ottlcee exist at each level of the hkrarchy, and at additional
levels, which have not been shown.
WEATHER OBSERVATIONS
The spac,; vehicle launch and landing sites within the United
States are shown in Table 1. There are numerous additional landing
sites overseas for manned vehicles. Manned (Space Shuttle) and un-
manned vehicles are launched into near-equatorial orbits from KSC.
Unmanned vehicles are launched into polar orbits from Vandenberg
AFB. Smaller unmanned rockets are also released from Wallops Is-
land, Virginia, but the panel did not examine this program's weather
support, which is provided by a private contractor.
Launches may not proceed without acceptable conditione at the
launch site, at the scheduled landing site, and at other locations that
would serve as landing sites in the event of abort once around (AOA),
trans-Atlantic abort landings (TAL), or end of mission (EOM) deci-
sions.
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_ TABLE 1 Launch and Landing Sites Within the United States
'i Launch Landing _
_ Kennedy Space Center, Florida (KSC) X X
Vandenberg AFB, California X
Edwards AFB, California X
i White Sands Space Harbor, New Mexico X
Wallops Island, Virginia X
Detachments of the USAF/AWS are responsible for meteorolog-
ical observations at the launch and landing sites, except for White
Sands, which is the responsibility of the U.S. Army Atmospheric
Sciences Laboratory. AWS also has the responsibility for weather
observations at most of the other worldwide landing sites for manned
vehicles. At KSC, the AWS uses a contractor, Pan American, to
take surface and upper-air weather observations and service the field
miU network and a number of other weather sensors deployed around
KSC. These are described in Chapter 3.
The weather observations required for the space program are
not routine. Many of the measurement systems are at the forefront
of atmospheric science today. Thus the observers and maintenance
personnel must be specifically qualified.
The total NASA observation and instrumentation program is
not as well organized and supervised as it should be. For example,
there is a lack of quality control: the one electric field mill site the
panel was shown at KSC could not work properly because the sensor
was mounted improperly and was too close to an electrical outlet
and a rope fence. For another example, an aircraft is flown prior
to each shuttle launch with minimal instrumentation; yet this same
aircraft could be instrumented to make measurements of the electric
fields in various types of clouds. The second example also illustrates
a more widespread problem: although there is a wealth of talent
and facilities within the agencies involved with the space program,
the resources have not been adequately mobilized toward addressing
operational weather problems at KSC.
The Weather Support Office should perlodlcally (1) assess
whether or not weather observations and observers meet the
1989004487-036
needs of the space program_ (2) conduct through _mrpec-
tlmm to determine if observing systems are properly ¢onflg- i
i
ured, calibrated, and maintained, ($) ascertain whether or
not available resources are being fu_ uJed to support space
flight, and (4) take actions to correct any problems identified.
WEATHER ANALYSIS AND I_ORECASTINC
At KSC, weather analysis and forecasting for daily ground oper-
ations, launches, and air-sea rescue efforts are the r_sponsibilities of
the Air Weather Service, 4th Weather Wing, 2nd Weather Squadron,
Detachment 11, Patrick Air Force Base, and Cape Canaveral Forecast ,i
Facility. An exception is that Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC)
analyzes the prelaunch sounding data and furnishes them to JSC for
use in the computer programs that calculate loads (stress/torque) on
the launch vehicle, i
Because of the large number of daily weather-sensitive activities !
and because both civilian (20 percent) and military (80 percent)
vehicles are launched from KSC, the amount of work required is
considerable. AWS officers and enlisted personnel, most reassigned
at 2- to 3-year intervals, and two "permanent" civilians make up the
weather forecasting staff at the Cape Canaveral Forecast Facility,
which services KSC. Forecasts for unmanned launches are the re-
sponsibility of the AWS detachments at the launch site, either Cape
Canaveral Forecast Facility or Vandenberg i_nvironmental Support
Center. Forecasts for occasions when the Space Shuttle is ferried
from its landing site back to KSC are also the responsibility of AWS.
Once a Space Shuttle is launched, control of the mission trans-
fers from KSC to JSC. Weather forecasting responsibility, even in
the event of RTLS (Return to Launch Site, or "mission abort") or
over-water ditching, rests with the NWS/NOAA Spaceflight Meteo-
rology Group at JSC, although they coordinate and collaborate with
their AWS counterparts at KSC. The NWS/NOAA team also has
forecasting responsibility for all worldwide landing sites.
A team of nine meteorologists makes up the staff of the weather
office of the Spaceflight Meteorology Group at JSC, of which three
are primarily responsible for managing the Meteorological Interac-
tive Data Display System (MIDDS), applications programming, and
technology transfer. These three meteorologists constitute the Tech-
nique Development Unit at JSC, but when the panel visited JSC only
one h_l been hired. When the Space Shuttle program res,;mes more
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frequent launches, and in order to effectively use new techniques and
technology proposed later in this report, the size of the stalf will need
to be increased. _
_ The dh'ect,or of WSO should (1) _ that forecast omce _'_
staffing at all sites k adequate for the asslgn_l ta_s, u-
_i peclslly as launch frequency is increased, and (3) conduct
intraagency and interagency briefings to ensure that the var-
_i lo_s agm, cles with weather forecast and support responsFoUi-
,i ties are properly coordinating with each other during manned
and mzmanned space operations.
APPLIED RESEARCH
The AWS and NWS forecast offices st KSC and JSC are oper-
ational units, not charged with research missions. Present staffing
does not allow them to undertake applied research programs, aside
from limited forecast studies and software development. Within AWS
the latter activities are done by forecasters during slack operational
periods. Within NWS, several staff members are dedicated to a
Techniques Development Unit _hat performs these types of activi-
ties. Though the forecast o/_ices cannot perform the n:eded applied
research, the AWS and NWS forecasters should play a strong role
in identifying problems and requirements for applied research and
technique development directed toward carrying out their mission.
Larger applied research tasks are performed by other (nonfore-
caster) agency personnel or are contracted to universities or private
agencies. Within NASA these efforts are funded by the C)l_ce of
Space Flight at NASA headquarters, by the director of KSC or JSC
or by project leaders at these centers, or by one of the other NASA
centers (such as MSFC). In the past, MSFC has been responsible
for weather technology transfer and technology utilization programs
for NASA space flight. There are other major meteorological re-
search programs within NASA that are outside the jurisdiction of
the OSF, such as Goddard Space Flight Center, Langley Research
Center, Ames Research Center, Lewis Research Center, and the Jet
Propulsion Laboratory. ,_
Within the Air Force, research is conducted and contracted by
the Air Force Geophysics Laboratory (AFGL) or the Air Force O/Tice
of Scientific Research (AFOSR). A number of NOAA laboratories and
cooperative institutes perform research on instrumentation systems
and on diagnostic and prognostic techniques, some of which deal
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specifically with KSC under contract, ,and others of which could be
of use in s system tailored toward solving KSC's problems. Most
of this research is genersted within the individual unit and is notcentrally directed.
On several occasions the panel encountered different views re-
g_rding the perceived versus actual roles of research sgencies. Strong
central coordination is required to ensure thst spp]ied research efforts
are complementary rsther than redundant, are directed toward solv-
ing operstional needs, and are pursued to the stage where the results
can be effectively spplied toward solving operstional problems.
The Werther Support Office should be staffed with atmo-
spheric scientists who are capable of evaluating applied re-
search actbdtles, stlnmlath_ new applled research efforts
needed to meet unaddree_ed needs of the space program,
and _oordlnatlng these efforts.
I
Observing Systems
The weather sensitivities of the space pzogrsrn demand rues- lt
suremente of parameters quite different from those mr_ie for use in
providing the public with weather forecasts. The types and sizes
of precipitation particles in clouds and the potential for triggered
lightning are just two examples. Because of the special requirements
of the space program, certain deficiencies exist in the observational
program at KSC and other sites that can be remedied by a combi-
nation of upgrading existing systems, acquiring and deploying new
equipment now available, and conducting applied research to develop
needed equipment not yet available anywhere in the world. These
activities range from adding displays and calibrating instruments:
which could be accomplished in a few days, to applied research that
could take a few year_. Improvements should be planned a-d coor-
dinated by the Weather Support Office (WSO).
Most of the critical weather elements discussed in Chapter 1
cannot currently be observed with the high degree of accuracy re-
quired in _ endeavor as weatu_,-sensitive as the space program,
where small errors can produce catastrophic results. Although most
public-servi¢._ forec_ters would be pleased to be correct 90 percent
of the time in yes-no forecasts of precipitation, an accuracy that
lo_ fo:;any of the weather elements critical for space flight could be
devastating. The ivescapable _onclusion is that accuracies of about
99 percent or greater are neet.ed when critical fail ires would result.
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This requirement almost certainly dictates that decisions concerning !
weather-sensitive operations (I) will always be made as late as possi-
ble, (2) will he based largely upon observations at decision time, and
(3) should err in favor of postponing the weather-sensitive activity if
criticvJ weather is even a slight possibility. Thus, aside from planning
efforts that require forecasts for days or longer, the forms of weather
information most important for space operations are diagnoses of ex-
isting conditions and very-short-term weather forecasts for periods
of several hours or less.
As long as launches are infrequent and delays are tolerable, there
is likely to be little pressure on the system. However, as launches
become more frequent, weather-related delays will be less tolerable,
and therefore improved capabilities for detection and forecasting of
adverse weather are needed. How unfailingly can state-of-the-science
instruments adequately detect critical weather elements? How well
can state-of-the-science methods be used to forecast critical weather
clements for 2-hour intervals?
This chapter gives an overview of (1) some of the existing mea-
surement systems used at KSC (and, to a limited extent, at other
sites), (2) other systems available for deployment, and (3) remaining
needs for development cf instrumentation to observe a few important
meteorological parameters.
UPPER-AIR SOUNDINGS
High-resolution vertical profiles of wind speed and direction are
needed to assess wind loads on the launch vehicle during launch
and landing. The jimsphere balloon, tracked by radar, provides
the greatest vertical resolution in measuring winds aloft. Data are
normally obtained at 100-foot (30-m) intervals. Jimspheres provide
the data used in assessing the wind loads prior to launches at KSC
and Vandenberg.
Near the jet stream there can be large wind variations in less
than 2 hours that could make prelaunch balloon-ba_ed soundings
unrepresentative of launch conditiolls. Balloon-based wind profiles
require abo,lt an hour to measure winds to 55,000-foot (17 kin)
altitudes, so it is impossible to obtain soundings at less than 1-haur
intervals unless multiple tracking devices are available and several
balloons are airborne at the same time.
Doppler wind profilers, which have been under development for a
J
1989004487041
_; decade, are in operation in a number of pl_ces worldwide. Although '"
their vertical resolution is somewhat poorer than that of the jim- .
_' sphere system, wind profilers can provide data at intervals as short
as 30 seconds, if desired. There are plans to install a Doppler wind
_r profiler st KSC before the end of 1988.
The wind profilers should be installed at and _urrounding KSC
: i_ crder to monitor important changes in the wind. Wind and wind
she_- da_, as well as spectrum width of the profiler winds (which is
rel.lted in part to turbulence within the beam), should be collected.
i O._ce 4 suitable profiler data base is attained, the method of as-
sessing launch wind load hazards to the shuttle should be examined.
It should be determined if a network of wind profilers at and sur-
rounding KSC could be used to obtain very-_hort-term forecasts of
wind profiles at launch time through advection of wind field patterns
across the network. A numerical model might be helpful in making
these forecasts.
The type of wind data really needed during a launch is a profile
along the launch trajectory. Neither balloons, which drift with the
wind, nor profilers can provide this type of sounding. Aircraft are
bett,.,r suited to provide this type of information, but the present
prelaunch aircraft are not instrumented to make accurate wind mea-
suretnents. The program of prelaunch reconnaissance flights using
T-38 and Shuttle Training Aircraft should be upgraded either by
adding instrumentation to these aircraft or by using other available
instrumented aircraft. Quantitative measurements should be made,
over and upwind of KSC, of cloud electric fields, the types and
sizes of precipitation, electric fields and Maxwell currents, winds,
wind shears, and turbulence. A computerized data collection system
should be used to facilitate the real-time collection and archiving
of these data, and al_ to transmit _he data to KSC forecasters for
timely use. MSFC should explore the possibility of using these data
as part of the JSC loads a_sessment program.
Thermodynamic soundings (temperature and relative humidity)
are needed to obtain atmospheric density profiles during launches.
These are obtained by balloon-based instruments, particularly the
ground meteorological detector (GMD)-tracked radiosondes, and by
rocketsondes. These systems should be _ssessed against the state-
of-the-science technology, such as Loran-based balloon tracking sys-
tems. The latter have proven far superior to GMD systems for
obtaining accurate wind speed profiles during field research experi-
ments, especially durin8 situations of strong winds aloft and in terms
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of vertical resolution. Furthermore, the National Center for Atmo-
spheric Research (NCAR) Crcm-chaln Loran Atmospheric Sounding
System (CLASS) has been designed and demonstrated to operate
nearly automatically, and would potentially provide better data with
less manpower and co6t than the present Gh/_DsylJtem.
Remote soundings of temperature and humi_ty, obtained via
satellite-based rsdiometric profiling, currently have vertical resolu-
tion that is too coarse for use in the space program. WSO should
monitor the progress of research on these systems and be prepared
to put them into use in the space program, should their resolution
improve.
To obtain better Informatl_a about spatial and tempcnl
wu4atlous of the wlnd near KSC, NASA should estab]kh
a network of Doppler wind proflkrs and a program for en-
hanced aircraft olam-vatlons using avallabk NASA and U.S.
Air Porce ah_raft.
BOUNDARY LAYER AND SURFACE WEATHER
Near-surface winds are important for landings, launches, and
ground operations, and can be measured accurately and at very fre-
quent intervals (I minute or less) using automated weather stations.
A system of this type, called WINDS (Weather Information Network
Display System), is used at both KSC and Vandenberg, with sen-
_ors on towers from 54 to 500 feet at KSC and 12 to 300 feet at
Vandenberg. Winds from these networks are _vailable at 5-, 15-, or
30-minute intervals. Shorter intervak may be desired i_ the critical
minutes before launch, when passage efa gust front (outflow from a
distant thunderstorm) or the sea breeze front (moving in from sea)
could cause dramatic changes of wind direction and speed.
The existing automated surface mesonetwork (28 stations) is
a critical element in the observational program at KSC. It should
be expanded to the west to cover the western portions of the KSC
activity domain (and procurement of 20 additional stations is in
progress), and to the _qt to include measurements over water, via
buoys or platforms f,)r routine operations and/or via ships during
launch situations. The instrumentation should be expanded to in-
clude visual range transmissometers at the launch pads and the Shut-
tle landing field airstrip. The individual sites should be adjusted, if
1989004487-043
necessary, to ensure that the observations are taken st uniform S]- i
_ titudes, with proper exposure and sheltering, and with uniform and
_ well-maintained instrumentation. :_
_!_ A Doppler sodar (sonic detection and ranging) can be used to
, monitor the low-level (up to about 1 km) wind profile at 5-rninute
- intervals except during precipitation. This instrument has better ver-
' tics] resolution than the wind profiler, so Doppler sodars would be of
value in augmenting the tower wind network. Such data would prove
invaluable for dispersion forecasting and in providing information
regarding other surface operations. A Doppler Acoustic Sounding
System (DASS) is currently operated at Vandenberg.
The horizontal distribution of low-level winds provides important
information for weather forecasting. SmaU-scs]e fronts and wind
shift lines can escape detection if stations in a meeonetwork are more
than several kilometers apart. Scanning Doppler weather radars and
Doppler lidars can supply the type of spatial coverage needed to
locate such wind shift lines. A NEXRAD Doppler radar is expected
to be installed at Melbourne, Florida, about 25 miles south of KSC,
in 1990.
Because a single Doppler radar can detect motion only along a
radial, a netwof_ of at least two Doppler radars should be deployed
at KSC in order to resolve total horizontal velocities. Unfortunately,
the NEXRAD radar to be deployed at Melbourne within the next
severs] years will not scan in a manner conducive to multiple Doppler
radar studies in consort with another radar. NASA should acquire at
least two dedicated Doppler radars, which would enable calculation
of detailed patterns of winds in clouds and in the boundary layer. T¢
make the wind calculations in real time would require the deve)ol:-
ment of new dual-Doppler dat,_ processing and display software. In
addition to horizontal mappings of velocity, cross-sections along _he
space vehicle flight path could s]_o be constructed.
To obtain enhanced Inforamtlon about low-level winds and
other weather dement., NASA =__Jd expand the areal coy*
stage of the _rface mesonetwork and Include data platforms
over the ocean. At least two dedicated Doppler radars should
be Installed ha locations that optimise coverage over KSC
to improve forecasts using higher resolution boundary layer
data and to better relate the wind fields and reflectivlty
within clouds to the mlcrophyslcal and electrical develop-
mant. NASA should consider deploying Doppler sodare for
monitoring the boundary layer.
!! ) P crrAsxo
_ Showery precipitation often falls over areas of only a few square
_ kilometers, and rain gauge networks are rarely dense enough to
! resolve this detail. Conventional (non-Doppler, incoherent) weather
: radar can be used to obtain high-resolution mappings of areas with
precipitation. Forecasters use the horizontal and vertical shapes
of the radar %chose _ and the intensity of the echoes to identify
convective and stratiform precipitation. Satellite imagery can also
be used to help identify convective clouds. However, neither radar nor
satellites can unambiguously distinguish thunderstorms from other
types of convective precipitation.
State-of-the-science weather radars provide digital data that can
be processed by computerized sottware packages to derive additional
useful products such as vertically integrated liquid water contents,
cross sections of reflectivit,y at any desired angle, and animated im-
agery. The 30-year-old FPS-77 radar at Vandenberg is not digitized
and provides the forecaster only with snapshot views at fixed az-
imuth or elevation angle. A radar should be deployed at Edwards
AFB, and digital radars should be considered for both Vandenberg
and Edwards.
The thermal tiles on the Space Shuttle are eroded by precipita-
tion drops. However, there is a need for more detailed informa":_n
relating drop size and concentration to the extent of the tile damage.
Unfortunately, drop sizes cannot be measured using conventional
radar. Surface-based disdrometers are typically used to measure
raindrops reaching the ground, and an aircraft-mounted Knollenberg
probe can be used to sample sizes of precipitation aloft. These types
of instrumentation are not currently used in space operations, but
should be.
A possible tool of the future is the multiparameter radar, which
transmits at two wavelengths and with two polarities. Multiparam-
eter radars can distinguish between snowflakes, raindrops, and hail,
and between large drops and small drops. However, certain ambigui-
ties exist, such as melting snowflakes. Additional research should be
done to enable this tool to be utilized operationally.
To obtain data .n cloud and precipitation types and stses, air.
b(n-ne drol>-slse measuring instrumentation should be flown
prior to Space Shuttle launches, and a multtparameter radar
should be acquired.
+ LIGHTNING __
During the summer at KSC there is an average of about six
_- lightning strikes to ground per square mile each month. Until thelast decade, it was extremely difficult to detect and locate lightning _!
_. strikes on a real-time basis. Cloud-to-ground lightning strikes can
,/ now be successfully detected by using either magnetic direction-
i_ finding (Lightning Location and Protection (LLP)), omnidirectional
!i broad-band time-of-arrival (TOA) antennas (Lightning Position and
!_ Tracking System (LPATS)), or by careful interpretation of electric
i field mill network data. (Other methods also exist, such as lightning-
detection radar and lightning interferometers.) Lightning strikes
i are typically located with position accuracies of 2 km or better by
triangulation. An LLP r/stem is in operation at KSC; it should be
improved by periodically checking the site correction factors and the
antenna alignments.
Two larger lightning detection networks cover the KSC area: a
network of LLP direction finders operated by the State University
of New York at Albany and the Florida LPATS network of broad-
band TOA receivers. Displays of these data should be added to the
KSC weather office. Data from the SUNY Albany system showed
the movement of an area of considerable cloud-to-ground lightning
activity toward KSC from the west prior to the Atlas-Centaur 67
accident, as shown in Figure 4. Had these data been available in
the KSC weather office, it is likely that the launch would have been
postponed, averting the accident.
At KSC, at present, in-cloud and cloud-to-cloud lightning dis-
charges are difficult to detect. These occurrences can be inferred
from data provided by the Launch Pad Lightning Warning System
(LPLWS), a 30-station network of field mills that is designed to de-
tect electrified clouds. Because the LPLWS is the only network of
its kind in the world, few meteorologists have been exposed to these
data for use in real-time weather analysis and forecasting. Persons
who would typically provide forecaster training are not usually well
versed in this tool, and those familiar with field mill network inter-
pretation are usually more adept at using it in a research rather than
an operational environment.
The LPLWS is currently bei_g upgraded. The sensors should
be improved, and the sites should be carefully evaluated to identify
any local obstructions or sources of contamination, and obstructions
should be removed or sites relocated, if necessary. The network
should be expanded to the west and to the east, including over-water
U
TIMES UTC
• 1B_23-19:23
• 19,23- 20:23
• •2o.-23-m:23
FIGURE 4 StateUniversityof New York (SUNY) at Albany dkplay of LLP-
detected cloud-to-ground lightning prior to the Atlas-Centaur 67 launch. In the
3 hours prior to launch, |_ghtning activity progressed steadily across Florida
toward KSC. (Courtesy of R. Orville, State Un]vers]ty of New York at Albany.)
sites.The equipmentshouldbe carefullycalibratedand certifiedfor
operationaluse,and the observationsincludedinthelistofweather
criteriaforlaunch(andlanding).
In-cloudand cloud-to-cloudlightningcan alsobe detectedby
usingnetworksof(1)HF or VHF time-of-arrivalreceiversor (2)HF
or VHF lightninginterferometers.A system (LDAR) ofthe former
typewas previouslyoperatedatKSC but abandoned.A new system
_i ofthistypeshouldbe built.
The National Aeronautics and Space Administrat_on should
make Improvements to the existing LLP and LPLWS systems
and obtain displays of other lightning detection networks in
the area, in order to Improve detection of lightning and elec-
tric fields. A new system should be built to detect lightning
in and between clouds aloft.
__'_ _0_ _*_ _ _ _',_'_r_ _ _ _ __ _I ! {!
_: CLOUD ELECTRIC lq_LDS :r_ i
_ anvils, stratiform clouds, and shallow convective clouds, often do _
not produce lightning but do contain high electric fields. _ he threat
_ of triggered lightning from these clouds may be the most difficult _:_
_! weather hazard to detect and forecast. Surface electric fields do not
:,:. always reveal electric fields aloft or charge centers in the upper por- _ _
i tions of clouds, because of the presence of intervening (or screening) ii !
_ charged layers. Airborne electric field mill systems, such as those
i formerly used on the NASA FI06-B research aircraft, should be used _i_ i
to accurately characterize the electrical environment aloft. _
Much of the data collection and research on the subject of trig- _
gered lightning has been sponsored by KSC, _o that the center's
triggered lightning research is state-of-the-science within the atmo-
spheric electricity community. Additional efforts are needed to add
companion meteorological data (such as radar data, surface mesonet-
work and tower data, satellite data, and sounding data) to the trig-
gered lightning data base for possible forecasting applications and to
provide training to operational forecasters concerning the u_e of field
mill network data. Airborne measurements using field mills repre-
sent an important contribution to better defining the potential for
induced lightning.
The new launch criteria, designed to avoid any possibility of
triggered lightning, may have become overly conservative with re-
gard to cloud electric fields. To address this issue, one or more
instrumented aircraft should be flown on frequent occasions in order
to develop a climatological data base regarding electric fields and
Maxwell currents in adead" or detached anvils and anvils from dis-
taut thunderstorms. Data should also be collected in other types of
cloud near the freezing level.
_iggered lightning studies should be continued, with addi-
tional efforts to collect companion meteorological data sets.
Airborne electric field measurements should be collected to
enhance studies of the threat of triggered lightning.
OTHER WEATHER ELEMENTS
Dangerous icing conditions will result if a vehicle encounters
supercooled (i.e., liquid at subfreezing temperatures) cloud and pre-
cipitation drops. Owing to the poor spatial coverage of rawinsonde
i
!
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!i data and since conventional weather radar cannot distinguish be-
tween precipitation sizes or types, regions conducive to aircraft icing
;_ are very difficult to detect. Pilot reports are the main source of infor-
ii_ mation. Multiparameter radar, combined with temperature profiles,
ii might prove useful for detecting and avoiding freezin$ rain. Cloud
radars (wavelength of approximately 3 mm), which detect cloud-
sized particles, may prove useful in supercooled cloud detection, if
used with sounding data.
Clear-air turbulence, which arises within layers of large vertical
wind shear, is very hard to detect. It is most commonly detected and
reported by pilots. Some inibrmation regarding shears and hence
the possibility of turbulence can be derived from the spectrum width
of Doppler radar data, both from scanning Doppler weather radar
and from Doppler radar wind profilers. Much work remains to be
done, however, in calibrating the spectrum width values against the
incidence of _urbuler.ce. Satellite imagery can also often be used to
alert forecasters to areas where turbulence is likely.
Trained weather observers can also provide valuable data to the
weather forecaster. An observer has the unique ability to assimilate
audible and visual data in a manner that is better than most instru-
ments. To obtain quality information, the observers must be trained
to identify the specific conditions that may be conducive to weather
hazards such as trigsered lightning. At KSC, the weather office has
no windows, and forecasters cannot see outside without climbing to
the roof. It would be desirable to move the forecasting operations to
a room with a window or to make a window in the room currently
used, so that observers could more easily monitor rapidly changing
atmospheric conditions.
Trained and reliable observers and adequate facilities are needed
at all sites overseas and in the United States. The panel does not feel
comfortable with past arrangements for obtaining weather observa-
tions at overseas landing sites.
The National Aeronautics and Space AvLmlnlstration should
ascextain that launch and landing sites are provided with
skilled observers and necessary measurement systems. NASA
should monitor the achievements in observation technology
and deploy useful new instrumentation expediently.
Analysis and Forecasting Systems
t
i '
!i
The previous chapter has pointed out that there are many types
of observing platforms currently in use at KSC and other launch and
landing sites, and that improvements and additional platforms are
req-_red. In a real-time operational setting, however, new and im-
,ecl data do not necessarily translate into improved diagnoses and
._,.ecasts. If data from each source were considered independently,
I- the correct prognosis might become progressively blurred. This is
especially true because of the complexity of the mesoscale weather
systems that affect KSC, which may be of such small scale that indi-
vidual measurement systems are only able to give a skeletal picture
of the phenomenon. In this situation, the key to successful diagno-
sis and forecasting lies in the joint use of data from many different
sources, each providing a bit of information not treated by the others,
to obtr..:' a clear understanding of the weather situation. The skill
needed to perform this mental assimilation is not gained quickly or
easily. It requires intelligent, experienced, and dedicated personnel;
training; p_'actice; and the proper system (hardware and software)
with which to examine the data. These topics will be treated in this
chapter.
37
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DATA ACQUISITION AND DISPLAY
In order to perform timely analyses and diagnoses, the AWSfore-
casters servicing KSC and the NWS forecasters at JSC make u_e of a
computerized interactive analysis and display system called MIDDS
(Meteorological Interactive Data Display System). This systcm is
capable of displaying large-scale diagnostic and prognostic data_ as
well as zooming into the observational networks on the local scale
surrounding KSC. This powerful system can meet the hardware and
software needs of the mesoscale forecaster ff it is used optimally.
One strength of MIDDS lies in its graphical overlay capability,
which fosters the joint use of data in the manner discussed above.
This enables a clearer depiction of the structure of the weather
systems and an improved understanding of the interrelationships be-
tween the different scales of motion and different data fields, such as
between changes in the electric field and the movement and devel-
opment of radar echoes. Another invaluable feature is the looping
capability, which facilitates the use of prognoses based on extrapo-
lating the movement and evolution of the weather systems.
To be most efiective, however, all types of data must be accessible
on the MIDDS system. At the time of the panel's visit to KSC,
electric field mill and other data were not incorporated into the
MIDDS data base and had to be examined on a stand-alone display.
Future plans call for all data sets to be available on MIDDS; these
plans need to be promptly executed. All sources of satellite data,
including NOAA and DMSP polar orbiting satellites, as well as all
channels (e.g., visible, all infrared and near infrared, and microwave
channels) should be received.
The WeatherSupportOfficeshouldexpediteplanstoIncor-
poratealldatasetson MIDDS andpromotetheJointdisplay
I of disparate data sets.
Improvements in analysis and forecasting procedures can be at-
tained almost immediately through better use of existing data: (1) A
series of lectures and training sessions should be scheduled to bring
the staffs at KSC and JSC up to date regarding the latest tech-
niques and procedures in interpreting and using satellite imagery in
synoptic-scale diagnosis. Special emphasis should be placed on t_e
use of water vapor imagery. (2) A routine procedure should be estab-
lished requiring reanalysis of surface and selected upper-air charts at
more contour intervals and with less smoothing than those received
from the National Meteorological Center. (3) A MIDDS program
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i; should be wr:.tten to generate vertical time-sections of upper-air and
surface data and, ultimately, profiler dat_ This tool can help to de-
/! tec_, moderate-scale weather systems rind thereby enhance analyses
and prognoses. (4) Immediate benefits can be obtained through a
program of inviting visiting scientists with operational experience to I
interact with operational forecasters. 1Because the types of weather events that cause disasters are rare,it would be valuable to let a computer maintain a continuous lookout
for telltale signals of a potentially dangerous phenomenon. Human
, forecasters cannot watch the LLP display 24 hours per day, 365 days
per year, yet a 5-minute delay in detecting the first lightning dis-
charge on an otherwise quiet day could cost lives. An alert system
that is triggered whenever a critical weather element exceeds a hazard
threshold is needed. For example, an alert could be triggered when
the LLP lightning detection system detects a cloud-to-ground dis-
charge occurring within a certain distance of the launch pad or other
weather-sensitive area. Other alerts could be triggered by changes in
or large values of electric field, by excessive low-level wind shear, by
strong low-level moisture convergence, and so on.
Critical observatlcms or parameters derived from analyses
should be monitca-ed by computer to allow continuous mzrvetl-
lance between periods of human manltoring.
LOCAL OBJECTIVE ANALYSES
The abundant and diverse types of data may confuse weather
personnel unless steps are taken to assimilate and consistently ana-
lyze data from all sources and transform them into high-resolution
gridded fields of understandable variables.
Techniques to assimilate and analyze these data should be auto-
mated so that the forecaster need only consider fields analyzed from
gridded data, such as the three-dimensional vector wind. Similarly,
observations of temperature and moisture from satellites can be com-
bined with surface and mesonet observations to provide structure at
very fine scales.
By using a gridded format, a number of specific space-flight-
oriented products can be generated, and nowcasting can be greatly
enhanced. The detailed analyses can also serve as first-guess fields in
initialization of mesoscale numerical models. With four-dimensional
data assimilation techniques, the model equations themselves could
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i; form the framework nf the analysis algorithm, further improving the
:: process.
i_ There is a need to develop local (KSC) analysis systems that
incorporate all data sources and provide iflgh-resolutl_n grid-
ded tleld_ appropriate for forecaster and _erlcal model use.
INTERACTIVE I_ORECAST SYSTEMS
There is a need to develop aids to help forecasters avoid be-
ing overwhelmed and to help them systematically consider only the
data appropriate for use in making various forecast decisions during
differing weather situations. One such aid needed is classified as a
_decision tree," a stepwise procedure which enables the forecaster to
consider all pertinent data when being called on to forecast a given
condition or parameter. With the versatility of MIDDS, such decision
trees should be developed as dynamic tools that permit interactions
with the user. They should be developed to incorporate not only
observations and conceptual models, but also output from nested
mesoscale numerical prediction models, objective forecast studies,
and objective and subjective evaluations of forecasters.
The need to understand and forecast cloud electrical develop-
ment is particularly urgent. Since existing thunderstorms can be
monitored with the field mill, radar, and lightning detection net-
works, the three problems that requi:e attention are (1) the onset
of lightning in developing thunderstorms, (2) the continuation of
lightning in decaying thunderstorms or detached anvils, and (3) the
threat of triggered lightning in convective and nonconvective clouds.
Although these problems need longer-term applied research with
new measurement systems, some gains could be obtained through
subjective and statistical studies of available data sets. The exist-
ing yes/no da_a from triggered lightning studies at KSC, for exam-
ple, could be used together with parameters such as electric field,
cloud base height, height of the freezing level, cloud top i_:,_rared
temperature (or inferred height), distance from radar echo, surface
convergence/divergence values, and so on, to develop decision trees
for forecasting triggered lightning. Decision trees should also be de-
veloped for each of the other critical weather variables discussed in
Chapters 1 and 3.
Another approach to developing forecaster aids is through use of
expert systems or "artificial intelligence" (AI) techniques. In some
ways these approaches are similar to decision trees, but with heavier
.................'""till ..........
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: emphasis on the computer as opposed to human interaction. This
technique _lso might be worth applying to available electrified and
[ triggered lightning data and various accompanying data sets.
The panel believes that the artificial intelligence research going
on at KSC is addressing forecasting problems in a manner that is al-
most as if it is starting _from scratch" and that it is not likely to yield
state-of-the._cience forecasting techniq_es The panel suggests that
AI research be focused toward specific p'oblems such as determining
how to optimally combine measurement_ of the types listed above to
yield accurate short-term forecasts of the threats from natural and
triggered lightning.
There _ an urgent need for the development of interactive
_de¢iston trees" and computer-aided decision-making meth-
ods to help the forecaster make most efficient use of data in
reaching decisions, particularly in forecasting thunderstm-m
formation and natural and triggered lightning.
MESOSCALE FORECAST MODELS
Mesoscale forecast models offer the potential for dramatic en-
hancements in future forecast accuracy. Mesoscale models have suc-
cessfully simulated many irr,portant mesoecale circulations and storm
systems. New r:sted mesoscale models are becoming anal!able that
are nonhydrostatic and contain embedded fine mesh grids that pro-
vide enhanced resolution where small-scale structures are evolving.
With the help of a local analysis system, discussed in the previous
section, high-resolution analyses could be used to initialize these fore-
cast models. Model studies have demonstrat;d that, in many cases,
the forcing influences that generate mesoscale weather systems orig-
inate in the larger-scale environment and are therefore predictable
from coarser resolution init'_aldata.
Further _pplied research and development will be required to
realize the anticipated improvements _n forecast accuracy and to
adapt these models to an operational environment. Numerous issues,
such as data assimilation, model initialization, and parameterized
physics can be refined to improve the accuracy of mesoscale forecast
mc4els. With the installation of a wind profiler network, the KSC
environment would be ideally suited as a test bed for mescacale model
development and testing. NASA's weather-support should take an
active role in encouraging this recearch and work with the modeling
projects to develop products that address KSC forecasting needs.
a
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The National Aercmautlcs and _ ce Admlnlstratlon and
other partlclpants In the space program should take an active
role In encouraging development of numerical models dealing
with weather elements crucial to the space program.
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Implementation of Applied Research,
Technology Transfer and Training, and
Experimental Forecasting
Many suggestions and recommendations havc been made for im-
proving existing instrumentation and deploying new equipment for
various types of applied research that will enhance weather support
for space flight. In addition, outside of the space program there will
continue to be new developments that could prove useful for meteo-
rological support of space flight. These future weather research and
technique development programs offer the opportunity to enhance
substantially our ability to observe, understand, and thereby predict
the weather processes that axe important for KSC operations. Sev-
eral factors are currently contributing to an increased emphasis on
mesoscale weather systems that, if properly coordinated, could be of
great benefit to KSC forecasting. Research in mesoscale meteorology
is currently a very high national priority. This is reflected in the
growth of the NationLl STORM Program* and confirmed by the re-
cent NSF-UCAR Long-Range Planning Committee Report,** which
recommend.,_l a Mesoscale Meteorology "l_!tiative as one of four m_or
community science initiatives. Mesosc_de meteorology has advanced
* The N_iond STORM Proem, STORM Ccn_mlP_c, P_limln_l/ P_ra
Dc_'lm,May 1984, NC.__, Boulder, Co[orffido.
**The Atm_phcric Sciences: A Via'on _or 19git-1994. Report of the NSF-
UCAR Long-RAngePluning Commission, July 1, 1987, J. Dutton, Chffilrm_n,
48 pp. AwilLble from UCAR, Boulder, ColorLdo.
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in sophistication to the degree that the field can now contribute sub-
stantially to improved observation and prediction of local weather
features. Central Florida experiences many economically important
and scientifically interesting weather phenomena that are attract- i
ing new research initiatives in the area. The proposed Florida Area ;_
Mesoscale Experiment exemplifies the research interest in this area.
The prospects for advances in weather forecasting at KSC are
enhanced by a unique confluence of interest, need, and opportunity.
Substantial resources are already being directed toward weather phe-
nomena in the vicinity of KSC; the challenge is to focus and coor-
dinate these efforts to solve the most important weather forecasting
problems.
APPLIED RESEARCH AND PORECAST FACILITY (ARFP)
As new advances in observing and understanding weather sys-
tems are achieved, projects must be initiated to translate the ad-
vances into new and better forecast techniques that are then trans-
ferred quickly and effectively to operational use. Forecasters can i
gain additional skills through assimilating these techniques into their
individual repertoires. However, it is difficult to familiarize forecast-
ers with new techniques while they have ongoing operational duties.
Rotating forecasters through frequent training programs is one way
of providing technology transfer. Another is by establishing an ex-
perimental or simulated forecast environment where forecasters can
practice and gain working exposure to experimental activities or, a
daily basis. In talking with weather support personnel, the panel
perceived a general recognition of the efficacy of these concepts, but
heard widely differing views on how they should be achieved. The
panel is convinced that significant improvement in weather support
will require new approaches, increased cooperation, and a larger
commitment of resources.
Efforts to improve weather analysis and forecasting capabilities
can be greatly facilitated by a group that is charged with monitoring
the research advancements of the scientific corranunity and applying
the results to improve weather support for the space program. The
need for such a group has been recognized by several agencies, and
several operational units within NOAA, including the Spaceflight
Meteorology Group at JSC, already have positions designated for
these functions. However, the three-person NOAA effort at JSC is
1QRQNAAQ7
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below a critically effective stalling level, is not sufficiently broad in _•
scope, and is not, located at KSC where it would be most effective.
The panel believes that the c_ation of an Applied Research and
Forecast Facility (ARFF) at KSC would provide an ideal focus for
future applications research and the development of new forecasting
techniques. The ARFF should have responsibility for operating and
evaluating prototype observing systems, developing and evaluating
new forecast took and techniques, sad contributing to forecaster _
training and forecast verification. For such a facility to be success-
ful, it must also have the active involvement of the research and
operational communities. '_
An Xpplled Research and l_ort_.astlughdllty (AR_I_) should
be established at KSC to promote the development and ap-
plL-atlc_ of new tt_miqm_ to tmprov_ fcrt_utizg for space
operatise.
Intersetlon Between AR_I_, Operational Units, and
Applied Research Groups
The Applied Research and Forecasting Facility should be a
mission-oriented interagency facility that is managed by NASA
through the newly created Weather Support Office (WSO). Its direc-
tor should be an atmospheric scientist who has experience in both
operational and research meteorology. The staff would ideally in-
clude Air Force, NASA, and NOAA personnel, with term and visitor
appointments from throughout the atmospheric sciences to provide
a further infusion of both research and operational talents. This
facility could be created largely from existing resources by stream-
lining redundant activities and reorienting and reassembling these
resources.
The success of the ARFF would depend critically on its de-
veloping close working ties with the operations] forecast un'_ts and
establishing an attitude of team effort and mutual support. To pro-
mote these relationships, it is vital to have ARFF co-locatc-d with the
Cape Canaveral Forecast Facility servicing KSC and to rotate opera-
tional staff between them regularly. Joint weather discussious should
be conducted on a daily basis, as a vehicle :o stimulate interaction.
Clearly, there must be only one source of operational forecasts
at KSC, and this responsibility should remain with the AWS forecast
team. However, by operating in close proximity, the operational and
experimental units can develop a cooperative relationship, where the
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FIGURE 5 Schematic diagram of the Applied Research and Forecasting F_il-
ity (ARFF), its component., and its interactions with other unit. snd agencies.
ARFF scientists and forecasters know the forecast requirements, and
the on-line forecasters are receptive to new approaches. Although
co-located with the Cape Canaveral Forecast Facility, the ARFF
would serve not only those AWS forecasters, but also the AWS
forecasters from other detachments and the NOAA forecasters from
JSC. Operational forecasters and applied researchers should spend
time at ARFF, rotating into the ARFF at regular intervals.
Figure 5 is a schematic diagram of the components of the ARFF
and the routes of interaction between ARFF and other groups.
As shown in the diagram, ARFF can be divided functionally into
three sections: an Observing Systems and Technique Development
(OSTD) Program, a Cooperative Applied Meteorology Program
(CAMP), and a Forecaster Education and Training Program. A
Weather Support Advisory Committee should assist the WSO in
reviewing plans for, and progress of, the ARFF. Each of these com-
ponents is discussed in a separate section below.
The Applied Research and l_orecastlng l_aciilty should pro-
mote Interaction between applied researchers and operational
forecasters. To effectively reach ferecast_.rs, ARl_F sho_.ld be
established adjacent to the operational forecast office at the
Cape Canaveral l_orecast l_acIlity servicIng KSC, and for_
casters from KSC and other units should be assigned tours of
1989004487-05.q
r- _._,_,/,,_i_._!_._,_ _,¸_¸ _, ___ ........ _ , _.......... _. /,_., _ ._, : _, _ . ,_./!,_ _, , ,_/_.,.,_: _ .... :i_ , ,_. .....
_ 47 _
duty within ,_.ILPI_.To provide researcher interaction, gov-
m-nment and university researchers should also be encouraged
to spend ttl_ at ._IlFI_.
Applied Research for Weather Support
Many applied research projects have been recommended in this
' report. Some projects require new equipment that is ready for in-
stallation into an operational environment, but they will still require
evaluation of the data on a real-time basis to identify and optimize
its utility in the local environment. For example, after a NEXRAD
radar is installed at Melbourne, Florida, it is likely that the "opera-
tional _ hail-detection algorithm (designed for the Midwest) will need
to be modified empirically to account for the reduced frequency of
hail reaching the ground in Florida, where the melting level is nor-
really higher. This type of project is best suited for real-time, in situ
investigation. The OSTD in ARFF will conduct these evaluations
and be the conduit for improved weather support.
Most research projects will require substantial development ef-
forts before products will be ready for testing in the operational
environment. Some of these projects can be done outside of KSC
by government and university researchers or by private contractors.
Regardless of where the research is to be performed, two items are
essential: a prioritized schedule of applied research to be performed
and a budget with which to sponsor it. The WSO, with the advice
of the Weather Support Advisory Committee, should provide the
schedule; WSO should provide the budget.
The present level of funding at KSC to support all the necessary
research initiatives is inadequate. However, even with additional
funding, the potential for enhancing research advancements cannot
be realized without z restructuring of research funding channels at
KSC. The current funding support is fractionated among a number
of groups, with little overall coordination, and without a clear focus
on the most important problems. Although KSC personnel are dedi-
cated and advances have been made, there appears to be no internal
core of expertise qualified to promote or critically evaluate most of
the research initiatives.
The panel advocates a well-funded, applied weather research
program, operating within ARFF, that heavily emphasizer _bs_rving
systems and development of forecasting techniques and tL._ is coor-
dinated by the WSO. The ARFF should contain a strong internal
1989004487-060
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core of scientific expertise, capable of assessing research proposals
and results. Research grants should be made through the facility
in support of priorities and directions specified in a comprehensive
long-range research plan. Outside peer review of research proposals
should be part of the evanlation process.
Applied research should be consolidated within the ARI?I?
at KSC. ARI_F should manltor advauees in all areas of at-
mospheric science to identify new technology that should be
deployed in support of the space program_ and it should
commkslon studies of this type through a research grants
program.
OBSERYINC SYSTEMS AND TECHNIQUE
DEVELOPMENT (OSTD)
A central function of the ARFF would be to evaluate new ob-
serving systems and analysis techniques, and to develop and test
new procedures for operational forecasting. These duties are broad
in scope and would encompass many of the activities conducted both
in NWS Experimental Forecast Centers and the NOAA Program for
Regional Observing and Forecasting Services (PROFS). The ARFF
would also have responsibility for monitoring the development of data
assimilation systems and mesoscale models and for promoting their
application in forecasting mesoscale weather systems in the vicinty
of KSC.
The facility should compile good climatological and weather data
bases in the vicinity of KSC for use in evaluating new forecast tech-
niques and to aid in assessing the impact of changes in weather-
related operating criteria. The climatological data required include
variables ether than those normally encountered (maximum and min-
imum temperatures, and so on), such as the critical weather elements
included in launch and landing weather rules.
In addition, the ARFF should have r_sponstbility for monitoring
operational forecasts and assessing the accuracy of forecasts of pa-
rameters identified within the launch and landing weather criteria.
This activity is requi_ed since accurate and meaningful stratification
of verification statistics is an important part of technique assessment
that can help eliminate forecaster biases and promute forecaster im-
provement.
The Applied Research and l_oreeasting l_aeUity should be
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!_: assigned responsiblllty for testing and evaluating prototype i_
i observingsystems, developlug improved forecast techniques, ,_
• verifying forecasts, and compiling climatological data.
I_ORECASTER EDUCATION AND TRAINING
i/ The educationand trainingofoperationalforecastersisparticu-
: larly important, especially in view of the special requirements placed
on forecasts for launch and larding operations. Another factor is
that forecasters rotate through the AWS, and new forecasters must
continually be trained. The Air Force has recently initiated several
organizational changes to increase the experience level an_ improve
the continuity of forecasters. This unit has developed a professional-
ism and a strong commitment to quality that provides an ideal base
on which to build.
The Air Force weather office conducts ongoing forecast train-
ing activities that should be continued. In addition, the ARFF
should have responsibility for augmenting this training, particu-
larly in the understanding of weather situations specific to KSC
and in the use of specialized forecast techniques. Training can take
place through several media; video tapes, simulated forecasts for
lannch/landing/recovery operations, lectures, and map discussions
are all possible methods. Real-time experience is also recognized as
one of the most valuable training mechanisms. Rotating operationM
fore<asters through the ARFF would serve to accelerate the learn-
ing process in an environment where daily forecast situations can be
evaluated with ARFF staff without the pressure of on-line respon-
sibility. In addition, as new tools and techniques become available,
there should be a formal transfer of knowledge, with adequate ac-
companying documentation.
Part of the ARI_F function should be to establish education
and training procedures for operational forecasting.
COOPERATIVE APPLIED METEOROLOGY
PROGRAM (CAMP)
Advancements in weather research that support space opera-
tions can benefit greatly from the organization of field programs and
stimulation of relevant research in the university community. Gov-
ernment agencies have found that cooperative programs with the
university community are an effective mechanism for administering
_ progranm where flexibility is important in maintaining an "edge-of- i
the-art capability? The panel believes that a Cooperative Applied
Meteorology Program (CAMP) with formal university involvement
would provide an ideal augmentation of the ARFF. CAMP would co-
ordinate fi_ld programs and other research beneficial to operational
weather problems, administer a research grants program, and pro-
mote strong scientific interactions with the permanent ARFF staff.
Establishing this strong university involvement could also serve to
attract funding from other agencies and other offices in NASA that
support atmospheric researcb.
Periodically, it is necessary to bring together a concentration of
special equipment, facilities, and talent to achieve breakthroughs in
the understand_,'g of specific weather phenomena. These field pro-
grams will be particularly important in advancing our knowledge of
electrical and microphysical processes in convective and nonconvec-
tive clouds in the KSC environment, and in determining the pre-
dictability of convection from the data provided by new observing
systems.
Making state-of-the-_xt observing systems available to the re-
search community will enhance interest that is already strongly in
evidence. The proposed Florida Area Mesoscale Experiment (FAME)
plans a major field program in central Florida in 1990. The ob-
serving systems and research objectives outlined in this report, if
implemented, should be highly compatible with the i_,terests of any
group interested in researching Florida weather. The facility should
become the prototype suggested in the letter in Appendix A.
Equipment upgrades planned by the National Weather Service
are likely to yield better information on weather systems affecting
KSC. A NWS NEXRAD radar is planned for installation at Mel-
bourne, Florida; the capabilities and limitations of this radar in
contributing to an advanced observing network must be assessed.
The NWS also plans to deploy a network of wind profilers over the
central United States. With research wind profilers already work-
ing in Pennsylvania (Pennsyl;_nia State University) and soon to be
installed in Florida (NASA) and Massachusetts (AFGL), there will
be a strong desirf by the atmospheric science community to deploy
wind profilers over the remainder of the East to form a continuous
networkfrom theRockiestotheAtlantic.Severaluniversitiesare
alreadypreparingajointproposalfora SoutheastProfilerNetwork.
Theseand otherinitiativesshouldbe scrutinizedand,ifappro-
priate,coordinatedbyCAMP aspartofaconcertedefforttoimprove
(
7the understanding and prediction of important weather features in
central Florida.
A Cooperative Applied Meteorology Program (CAMP)
thoeLldbe establlshed w_thin the ARFF to pr_ote the par-
tlclpatlon of university and mlmflon-ageney scientists in field
programs advancing weather research and forecasting in the
vicinity of KSC or at other launch and recovery sites.
The advanced observing systems, comprehensive data sets, and
new techniques developed will provide an attractive facility for re-
search ecientist_, operational meteorologists, and graduate students
to visit, where they can interact with ongoing activities. These visi-
tors would provide a continuous influx of new ideas and approaches
and would become aware of important weather phenomena in the
KSC area that might stimulate further research on these topics in
the scientific community. The University Corporation for Atmo-
spheric Research (UCAR) might be the ideal organization to admin-
ister this program, because it already has experience in the types
of activities recommended for CAMP. UCAR has strong university
connections, has a Naval Environmental Prediction and Research
Facility (NEPRF)/National Meteorological Center (NMC) Visiting
Scientist Program (VSP), and is in an excellent position to monitor
closely related programs going on in NCAR.
A strong visiting scientist program should be established
within CAMP to attract research and operational talents
from throughout the nation that contribute to the goals of
the ARI_F, within the guidelines of WS0.
WEATHER SUPPORT ADVISORY COMMITTEE
To ensure that the director of the WSO and the director of the
ARFF receiveunbiasedviewsandthebesttechnicaldviceavailable
as to opportunitiesand directions,a WeatherSupportAdvisory
Committeeshouldbe establishedby WSO. The committeeshould
reviewplansand giveadviceon futuredirections.The advisory
committeeshouldbe chargedwith ensuringthatNASA has and
maintainsthebestandmostcost-effectiveweathersupportthatcan
be provided.As partofitsduties,theadvisorycommitte_should
monitortheoperationsoftheARFF anditsresearchgrantsprogram.
As hasbeennotedthroughouthisreport,seriousorganizational
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and coordination problems exist in the current weather support sys-
i tem. One mechanism for ensuring coordination among independent
agencies would be participation of high-level personnel from the var-
ious agencies in the Weather Support Advisory Committee. Thus it
is recommended that the committee consist of members from NASA,
Air Force, NOAA, and academia. The director of the WSO should
be an ex-otilcio member and should call and host the meetings.
The Weather Support Office should form a Weather Sup-
port Advisory Committee to periodically assess for the WSO
the organisational and tedmlcal Issuesthat affect weather
support for NASA's ipace operations.
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Letter from NASA to the Academy
Requesting Establishment of Panel
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NASA
Nabonal Aeronbuficsan(1
Space A(lmlnislrahon
Wash,nglon D C
_0_46 t:_V _ 7 r
_et,,,_A,,.L,' MO
D", Frank Press
president
National Academy of Sciences
2101 Constitution Avenue, NW
Washington, DC 20kl8
Dear Dr. Press:
NASA requeyts the assistance of the National Academy of Sciences in our
_ndeavor to improve the Natlonz! _pace Transpo_tatlon System (NSTS) Weather
Forecasting System. We require your atmospheric science expertise to identify
how NASA can instrument the Kennedy Space CJnter (KSC) as ¢ prototype weather
nowcasting facility.
On November 12, 1986, my staff discussed this request with Dr. John Perry of
the National _esearcn Council. Dr. Perry suggested we proceed wi_n a formal
request for the Academy's services.
Our objective is to encourage the research community to sponsor atmospheric
activities utlllzir_ KSC as a test ground for the appl_catlon of state-of-the-
science meteorological nowcasting techniques and terhnology.
Resumption of routine Shuttle landings at KSC is in part dependent upon
i_proving our current weather support system to provide a high level of
confidence in a 90-minute prelandlr_ forecast. The dynamic atmospheric
conditions manifested at K.SC,combined with the Space Shuttle sensitlvity to a
rar_e of environmental parameters (thunderstorms, l:_htning, turbulence), make
this a very challengln_ requirement.
The Office of Space Flight is in the process of developing _ 5-Year NSTS
Weather Forecasting Improvement Plan, consistent with th_ recommendations of
the Presidential Commission o- the Space Shuttle Chal)enger Accident.
Development of KSC as a prototype Jowcaatlr& facility i_ a cornerstone of that
plan.
We would like yo_ to defi e the improvements necessary to create such a
prototype system and pro lie NASA with an implemeqtation pla_.
W( look forward to worktn£ with the Academy to dew.lop a state-of-the-scle_.c-
weather forecasting capability for the Space ShuttLe. Please contact
Karen Poniatowskl (FTS _53-2520) of my staff for any clarification.
Sincerely,
_ator
for Space Flight
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: List of Attendees and Participants
A. Aldrich, NASA/Hdqrs R. Holle, NOAA/ERL
V. Aquino, AWS/Hdqrs W. Jatferis, NASA/KSC
J. Arnold, NASA/MSFC G. Krier, NASA/Hdqrs
L. Austin, NASA/JSC R. Lavoie, NOA.A/NWS
R. Babcock, AWS/Vandenberg C. Lennon, NASA/KSC
J. Bates, NASA/JSC R. Lewis, AWS/JSC
A. Belier, 1NASA/KSC H. Loden, NASA/JSC
R. Bentti, NASA/KSC J. Madura, AWS/PAFB
K. Pobko, NASA/JSC J. Mahon, NASA/Hdqrs
T. Boles, AWS/JSC L. Maier, CSG/KSC
W. Boyd, ESMC J. McBrearty, NASA/KSC
N. Buss, AWS/KSC P. McCalman, NASA/KSC
G. Chapman, AWS/Hdqrs R. McClatchey, AFGL
G. Coen, NASA/JSC M. McCulley, NASA/JSC
R. Crippen, NASA/KSC R. McPherson, NOAA/NMC
J. Crowley, AWS/JSC J. Meyer, NASA/KSC
J. Ernst, NASA/Hdqrs C. Morrill, NOAA/JSC
G. Fichtl, NASA/Hdqrs T. Myers, AWS/Edwards
J. Friday, NOAA/NWS W. Newman, NASA/KSC
K. Glover, AFGL S. Nichols, NASA/Hdqrs
M. Henderson, NASA/JSC J. Nicholson, NASA/KSC
H. Herring, Pan Am/ESMC P. Nostrand, AWS/JSC
K. Hill, NASA/MSFC L. Penn, NASA/JSC
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A. Peterson, NASA/Hdqrs R. Thorson, NASA/JSC
K. Poniatowski, NASA/Hdqrs C. Tracy, AWS/Andrews AFB
I D. Puddy, NASA/Hdqrs R. Truly, NASA/HdqrsG. Rigdon, NOAA/JSC M. Uman, U. of Florida
T. Robertson, AWS/JSC R. Wesenberg, NASA/KSC
D. Rotzcl], NOA.A/JSC M. Wheeler, AWS/CCAFS
R. Sieck, NASA/KSC V. Whitehead, NASA/JSC
J. $meclley, N_SA/KSC T. Wilfong, AWS/CCAFS
O. Smith, MSFC/CSC G. Wilson, NASA/MSFC
J. Stahman, ESMC R. Wojtasinski, NASA/KSC
T. Strange, AWS/KSC J. Womack, NASA/KSC
E. Tarkington, NASA/JSC J. Young, NASA/JSC
J. Theon, NASA/Hdqrs
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Appendix C
Recommendations from the Report of the
Space Shuttle Weather Forecasting
Advisory Panel to the NASA Associate
Administrator for Space Flight,
October 1986
1. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration should
establish a Weather Support Office at the top level of Shuttle oper-
ations to plan, organize, focus, and direct the activities related to
Space Shuttle weather support. The head of this office should be
a senior atmospheric scientist or a senior technical manager with a
strong operations background, who is knowledgeable about opera-
tional weather forecasting and research and development and who
commands respect in the meteorological and NASA communities.
Under the optimum organizational structure, the head of this office
would have line authority for all Shuttle weather support person-
nel and programs. However, both the present and planned Shuttle
launching ranges are operated by the Air Force to meet both Shuttle
and additional requirements, and the Shuttle itself is operated by
NASA, The panel recognizes that the optimum arrangement may be
impossible to implement in practice and recommends that responsi-
bility and authority for programs and personnel be consolidated in
the Shuttle Weather Support Office to the extent possible.
2. There must be a small, highly qualified, well-trained, and
dedicated team of forecasters who provide weather support for Shut-
tle operations.These forecastersshouldbe willingtobe an integral
partofthe Shuttleteam and remainso forextendedperiods(5to 10
years).Stepsshouldbe takentoensuretheircontinuityand devotion
tothetask(by gradeand/orsalaryadjustmentsorotherincentives).
59
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3. To ensure that this team has the very latest research results
and tools available and is trained to use these tools effectively, the
head of the Weather Support Ofl_ce should expand Techniques Tran-
sition Units at each operational site. These units should consist of
one or two highly competent applied meteorologists and one or more
computer spec;alists to act as an interface between the research and
development community and the Shuttle forecast team.
4. There should be a standing advisory panel of experts to
assist the Weather Support Office in charting its course, setting its
priorities, and aiding in contacts with the Shuttle Program Office to
secure continued support and visibility within NASA for the Space
Shuttle weather effort.
5. The Meteorological Interactive Data Display System
(MIDDS) can depict weather situations on a global basis. It is
thus a key ingredient in forecasting and in communications of poten-
tim hazards to decision makers. The system needs to be developed
at Johnson Space Center (JSC), and eventually Edwards Air Force
Base (EAFB) and Vandenberg Air Force Base (VAFB). At each site
having weather support responsibilities, MIDDS must be maintained
and periodically upgraded to ensure that it represents the state of
tbe art in rapid data access, analysis, and display capabilities.
6. The Doppler radar requirement to aid in the detection and
observation of weather developments should rely on the NEXRAD
facility, which will be installed and operated by the National Weather
Service near KSC. Research on the processing and application of
Doppler radar data should precede the completion of that installation
to ensure that the data can be utilized promptly.
7. The models that are used for Space Shuttle wind-loading
calculations need to be reexamined in view of the availability of
ground-based remote wind profilers and their planned installation at
KSC. Because the panel was unable to obtain access to the relevant
computer algorithms, it is not possible to comment here concerning
the adequate accuracy and resolution of these profilers for wind load
assessments.A thorough study of methods and models forshort-
range wind forecastingshouldbe undertakenwith theseand other
technologicaldvancesunderconsideration,inviewoftherapidwind
profilechangesunder way precedingthe Challengerlaunch.Rapid
wind profilechanges are undoubtedlycommon under many other
weathersituations.
8. The mesonetwork at KSC needsquality-controlreviewand
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probable augmentation for short-range wind and convective activity
forecasts.
9. At KSC, airborne instrumentation is required to quantify
the precipitation sizes that are observed over the launch site prior to
launch to determine whether the precipitation may pose a threat to
the orbiter thermal protection system.
10. A thorough study should be made of the available subsyhop-
tic and meececale models to provide guidance to the Shuttle forecast
team. Specific models should be selected and developed in parallel
to ongoing operations. The use of such models as forecasting aids
may have near-term payoff.
11. Research on artificial intelligence (AI) at KSC should be con-
tinued at a modestly supported research level until it can be shown to
have real promise for the Shuttle forecast problem. Before investing
significant resources in AI, it would be advisable to wait until some
other group or agency has shown that this tool has potential for a
similar type of forecast environment.
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Proposed Weather Factors Governing
Launch Commit Criteria and Flight Rules
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ShuttleLaunchCommitCriteriaand Background
JSC-16007
Sec. 1.4
Weather Guidelines/Rules
LCC RULE: AMBIENTTEMPERATURERESTRICTIONS
!A. PRIORTO EXTERNALTANKCRYOGENICLOADING.
PROPELLANTLOADINGOF THE EXTERNALTANK (ET)SHALLNOT BE
INITIATEDIFTHE 24 HOURAVERAGETEMPERATUREFORTHE PRECEEDING24
HOURSHAS BEENBELOW41 DEGREESFAHRENHEIT.
B. FROMSTARTOF ET CRYOGENICLOADINGTO LAUNCH.
THE COUNTDOWNSHALLNOT BE CONTINUEDNOR THE SHUTTLELAUNCHEDIF
THE AMBIENTTEMPE_TUREDURINGTHISTIMEPERIODEXCEEDSANY OF THE
FOLLOWINGCRITERIAFOR MORETHAN30 MINUTES.
(]) MAXIMUMTEMPERATUREOF 99 DEGREESFAHRENHEIT
(Z) MINIMUMTEMPERATUREOF 37 DEGREESFAHRENHEITFORWIND
CONDITIONSAT OR ABOVE5 KNOTS.
(3) MINIMUMTEMPERATUREOF 47 DEGREESFAHRENHEITFOR STEADYSTATE
WINDCONDITIONSBELOW5 KNOTS.
LCC RULE: PRECIPITATIONCONSTRAINT
THE SHUTTLEVEHICLEWILLNOT BE LAUNCHEDIF:
A. PRECIPITATIONEXISTSINTHE FLIGHTPATH
B. ICEACCUMULATESIN ZERO-ICEOR RESTRICTEDTHICKNESSAREASON THE
ET.
Rationale:ThermalTileProtection
LCC RULE: SURFACEWIND LIMITSFOR LIFT-OFF(MEASUREDAT 60' LEVEL)
THE SHUTTLEVEHICLEWILLNOT BE LAUNCHEDIF:
WINDSARE GREATERTHAN:
A. 2Z KNOTS- STEADYSTATE
PRELIMINARY
.......................i............ ............1
4
J
B. 32 KNOTS- PEAK
Rationale: Destgn Requirement of JSC 07700 Vol X i
LCC RULE: NATURALAND TRIGGEREDLIGHTNINGCONSTRAINTS
THE LAUNCHWEATHEROFFICERMUST HAVECLEARAND CONVINCINGEVIDENCETHAT
THE FOLLOWINGCONSTRAINTSARE NOT VIOLATED.
DO NOT LAUNCHIF:
A. ANY TYPE OF LIGHTNING IS DETECTEDWITHIN lO NM OF THE LAUNCHSITE
OR PLANNEDFLIGHT PATHWITHIN 30 MINUTES PRIOR TO LAUNCHUNLESS
THE METEOROLOGICALCONDITIONTHAT PRODUCEDTHE LIGHTNING HASMOVED
MORETHAN10 NMAWAYFROMTHE LAUNCHSITE OR PLANNEDFLIGHT PATH.
PLANNEDFLIGHT PATH: THE TRAJECTORYOF THE FLIGHT VEHICLE FROM
THE LAUNCH PAD THROUGH ITS FLIGHT PROFILE UNTIL IT REACHES THE
ALTITUDE OF IO0,O00 FEET. THE FLIGHT PATH MAY VARY PLUS OR MINUS
O.S NAUTICAL MILES HORIZONTALLY UP TO AN ALTITUDE OF 25,000 FEET.
DO NOT LAUNCH IF:
B. THE PLANNED FLIGHT PATH WILL CARRY THE VEHICLE
(]) THROUGH CUMULUS CLOUDS WITH TOPS HIGHER THAN THE +5 C LEVEL;
OR
(2) THROUGH OR WITHIN 5 NM OF CUMULUS CLOUDS WITH TOPS HIGHER
THAN THE -IO LEVEL; OR
(3) THROUGH OR WITHIN ]0 NM OF CUMULUS CLOUDS WITH TOPS HIGHER
THAN THE -20 C LEVEL; OR
(4) THROUGH OR WITHIN 10 NH OF THE NEAREST EDGE OF ANY
CUMULONIMBUS OR THUNDERSTORM CLOUD INCLUDING ITS ASSOCIATEG
ANVIL
CUMULONIMBUS CLOUO: ANY CONVECTIVE CLOUD WHICH EXCEEOS THE -20 DEGREE
CELSIUS TEMPERATURE LEVEL
ANVIL: STRATIFO_ OR FIBROUS CLOUD PRODUCED BY THE UPPER LEVEL OUTFLOW
FROM THE THUNDERSTORMS OR CONVECTIVE CLOUDS. ANVIL DEBRIS DOES
NOT MEET THE DEFINITION IF IT IS OPTICALLY TRANSPARENT
DO NOT LAUNCH IF:
C. FOR RANGES EQUIPPED WITH A SURFACE ELECTRIC FIELD HILL NETWORK, AT
ANY TIME DURING THE 15 MINUTES PRIOR TO LAUNCH TIME THE ONE MINUTE
AVERAGE ABSOLUTE ELECTRIC FIELD INTENSITYAT THE GROUND EXCEEDS i •
KILOVOLT PER METER (I KV/M) WITHIN 5 NM OF THE LAUNCH SITE UNLESS:
(A) THERE ARE NO CLOUDS WITHIN IO NM OF THE LAUNCH SITE: AND,
PRELIMINARY
liiis_'_'4' _"" ' Jill • " It
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7(B) SMOKEAND/ORGROUNDFOG IS CLEARLYCAUSINGABNORMALREADINGS
DO NOT LAUNCHIF:
L
: D. THE PLANNEDFLIGHTPATHISTHROUGHA VERTICALLYCONTINUOUSLAYER
OF CLOUDSWITHAN OVERALLDEPTHOF 4,500FEETOR GREATERWHEREANY
PARTOF THE CLOUDSARE LOCATEDBETWEENTHE ZERO (0) DEGREEAND THE
MINUS20 (-20)DEGREECELSIUSTEMPERATURELEVELS.
E. THE PLANNEDFLIGHTPATHISTHROUGHANY CLOUDTYPESTHAT EXTENDTO
ALTITUDESAT OR ABOVETHE ZERO DEGREECELSIUSLEVELAND THATARE
ASSOCIATEDWITHDISTURBEDWEATHERWITHIN5 NM OF THE FLIGHTPATH
DISTURBEDWEATHER: ANY METEOROLOGICALPHENOMEN3NTHAT IS
PRODUCINGMODERATEOR GREATERPRECIPITATION
F. DO NOT LAUNCHTHROUGHTHUNDERSTORMDEBRISCLOUDS,OR WITHIN5 NM
OF THUNDERSTORMDEBRISCLOUDSNOT MONITOREDBY A FIELDMILL
NETWORKOR PRODUCINGRADARRETURNSGREATERTHANOR EQUALTO 10
DBZ.
DEBRISCLOUD: ISANY CLOUDLAYEROTHERTHANA THIN FIBROUSLAYER
THATHAS BECOMEDETACHEDFROMTHE PARENT
CUMULONIMBUSWITHIN3 HOURSBEFORELAUNCH.
Rationale:Basedon the knowncloudtypesandconditionswhichproduce
naturaland/ortriggeredlightning
LCC RULE: GOODSENSERULE
EVENWHENCONSTRAINTSARE NOT VIOLATED,IFANY OTHERHAZARDOUS
CONDITIONSEXIST,tHE LAUNCHWEATHEROFFICERWILL REPORTTHE THREATTO
THE LAUNCHDIRECTOR.THE LAUNCHDIRECTORMAY HOLDAT ANY TIMEBASED
ON THE INSTABILITYOF THE WEATHER.
LCC RULE: SRB RECOVERYAREA
DO NOT LAUNCHIF:
A. SEA STATEEXCEEDSSEA STATECODE5
B. VISIBILITYLESSTHAN 1.5NM
MANDATORYRECOVERYFOR ASSESSMENTOF SOLIDROCKETREDESIGN
LCC RULE: RANGESAFETYWEATHERRESTRICTIONS
A. BLASTFOCUS(BASEDON SIMULATIONUSINGWEATHERBALLOONAND WIND
DATA)
(1) IFMORE THAN] FATALITYPER 100,000- HOLDOR SCRUB
PRELiMiNARY
1989004487-077
r ._._T,_t_=._w_.._u,_,,_,,_,___.:_,,_,_,_..._,_=,.. ¸_,,._.,__ _r._._,_,,_f_,_,,,_._;_.,:._ ,_,_,_ _,, _......
(Z) VALUES BETWEEN I PER IOO,OOO AND I PER l,OOO,OOO REQUIRE
EVALUATION BY ESMC COMMANDER
B. CEILING AND VISIBILITY (REQUIREDTO AID RADAR ACQUISITION)
MUST HAVE CLEAR LINE OF SIGHT UP TO 4500 FEET
C. LIGHTNING (PROTECTIONOF RANGE DESIRUCI SYSIEM) SAME AS NATURAL
AND TRIGGERED LIGHTNINGCONSTRAINTS.
,!
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PREFACE
THIS PUBLICATIONOF THE STS OPERATIONAL FLIGHT RULES, ALL FLIGHTS
(JSC-I2820)DATED MAY 9, 1988. REPLACES IN ITS ENTIRETY ALL PREVIOUS
VERSIONS. THIS DOCUMENT AND THE FLIGHT SPECIFIC STS OPERATIONAL FLIGHT
RULES ANNEX (JSC-18308)ARE INTENDED TO BE USED IN CONJUNCTION WITH ONE
ANOTHER.
STS OPERATIONALFLIGHT RULES IS A CONTROLLEDDOCUMENT FOR WHICH CHANGES ARE
SUBJECT TO PROCEDURES DELINEATED IN APPENDIX e AND IS NOT TO BE REPRODUCED
WITHOUT THE EXPRESS WRITTEN APPROVAL OF THE CHIEF, FLIGHT DIRECTOR OFFICE,
DA8, LYNDON B. JOHNSON SPACE CENTER.
ORGANIZATIONSWITH COMMENTS, QUESTIONSOR SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING THESE
FLIGHT RULES SHOULD DIRECT THEM TO DA8/C. L. GRUBY, FLIGHT DIRECTOR OFFICE,
BUILDING 29, ROOM IOIB, NASA JSC, HOUSTON, TEXAS 77058, TELEPHONE !
(713) 483-5558 (FTS 525-5558).
APPROVEDBY:
(DIRE_OR, MISSION OPERATIONS
RICHARD H. KOHRS ROBERT L. CRII_P_N _'.... J /
DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL DEPUTY DIRECTOR,NATIONAL
SPACE TRANSPORTATIONSYSTEM SPACE TRANSPORTATIONSYSTEM
PROGRAM OPERATIONS
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R RULE
4-64 LANDING $IIE WEATHER CRITERIA
THE WEATHER ELEMENT LIMITS CONTAINED IN THIS RULE MUST BE SATISFIED
WITH OBSERVATIONSAT THE GO/NO-GO DECISION TIME AND WITH THE FORE-
CAST FOR LANDING TIME (EXCEPT PRFLAUNCHEVALUATION OF THE FLIGHT
DAY I PLS WILL ONLY BE BASED ON THE FORECAST). THE APPROACHES TO
BOTH THE PRIME AND BACKUP RUNWAYS AT A GIVEN SITE MUST SATI_ZY THE
CEILINg, VISIBILITY, PRECIPITATION,AND THUNDERSTORM PROXIMITY
LIMITS LISTED BELOW. WHENEVER AVAILABLE, A WEATHER RECONNAISSANCE
FLIGHT WILL PROVIDE A LANDING SITE GO/NO-GO RECOMMENDATION.
A. CEILING AND VISIBILITY LIMITS:
VISIBILITY
CEILING (NOT LESS THAN)
(KFT) (SM)
i. EOM, NEXT PLS
RTLS, TAL, AND AOA IO (B ®) 7 (5 ®)
2. ELS (ORBIT AND ENTRY PHASES) i0 (8 G)
3. TAL, ACLS, OR ELS (ASCENT
PHASE) FOR MAIN ENGINE LIMITS
MANAGEMENT (REF. RULE 5-TBD)
OK ABORT GAP CLOSURE (REF.
RULE 4-26H.3, PERFORMANCE
BOUNDARIES)
a. TACAN AND MLS OPERATING N/A N/A
b. TACAN OPERATING, NO MLS TO 5
NOTES:
I ® APPLIES TO RUNWAY WITH MLS (REF. RULE 3-41, NAVAIDSPRELAUNCH REQUIREMENTS)AND REQUIRES WEATHER
RECONNAISSANCEFLIGHT EVALUATION.
(_ FOR TAL AND AOA WITH MLS: VISIBILITY MAY BE AS LOW
AS 5 SM ONLY IF THE FOLLOWING LANDING AIDS ARE
VISIBLE AND PREDICTED TO REMAIN VISIBLE ON FINAL
APPROACH (WEATHER RECONNAISSANCEFLIGHT EVALUATION):
(a) PAPI's FROM 8K FT TO PREFLARE
(b) BALL BARS FROM PREFLARE TO FINAL APPROACH
THIS RULE IS CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE
ALL FINAL 5/9/88 TRAJECTORY, GUIDANCE 4-53
MISSION REV DATE SECTION PAGE NO.
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4-64 LANDING SITE WEATHER CRITERIA - Continued
(Cont)
A. CEILING AND VISIBILITY LIMITS - Continued
The m_teoroloRical limits in this rule must be met with observations at the GO/NO-tin
decision time and with the forecast for the landing time This restrwtto'_ ts necessary to
ensure w_,atller violations _bserved at the decision time (ground or weather reconnais-
sance) would not permit a GO decision, euen if the forecast satisfies the limits Conuersely
if the forecast indicates a violation of the limits at landing time. a NO.GO decision will be
made. independent of the current obserua[ions. Since the flight day 1 PLS ,unding time zs
5 to 10 hours after launch, the forecast will only be used for the prelaunch flight day I PLS
evaluation.
The _ _'tling. uissbility, precipttatwn, and thunderstorm proximity bruits mum be met for
approaches to bath the prime and backup runways, at a #;uen site. This requirement
exists because current forecasting capahihty cannot accurately ensure that a NO.GO
condition to one of the backup runways would not result in a NO.GO condition at the
prime runway by landing time Surface wind limits are not required to be met at the
b_zckup runways, since the backup runway would only be required if an energy problem
occurred dwtatlng a runway redeszgnatzon.
A ceiling is defined as cloud cover >05 There are two ceiling limits..,_:e for runways
- with MI,S and a higher limit for runways without MI,S Using MLS. the rew can main.
i tatn the apprt_ach path accurately to a lower altitude before beginning tra_tt,_n to t.zsual
[ cues _PAPI's ball-bar and runu,,av markings) Eight thousand feet is the l_)u'est layer or
i: ceilinil permHted using MI, S For runways without MI.S. the cezhng minzmum :s
= IOK ft Ceiling limits are estobhshed to ensure thai the crew has sufficient time after
! breakr,tg ,,ut of the cloud deck ta acquire the runway and landt nil atds dt',zn_l pre.final
an_l bz .hag
THIS RULE IS CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE
ALL FINAL 5/9/88 TRAJECTORY, GUIDANCE 4-54
MISSION REV DATE SECTION PAGE NO.
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4-64 LANDING bITE WEATHER CRITERIA - C_.tlnued
(Cont)
A. CEILING AND VISIBILITY LIMII_ - Concludra
The surface uistbility limits were estobhshed t_ cor: espond t. _he eeding limtts Slant
range visibility down the Orbiter glide slope _s not recast rable from the ground, nor ts
slant range a stcndurd meteornlogwal mea_rement Ther "fnre, the surface {:istbtlity and
ceiling limits were established to proutde acceptabte slant range otstb.l,ty Restrlettons to
surface uistbdtty include smoke, h _ze. fog. dust. and clouds Fhe " SM surface : ,ibilit,
limd generally applies for all landtng condtttons, wtth a couple ex,-epttons The 7 Y;M i_
the horizontal distance component from the runway threshold that ( orrelat_'s to the !OK ft
altitude point on the outer ghde slope For A(,) A E'EDW or NOR I or TAL aborts, the
uistbillty requ:rements can be as low as 5 SM _f the runway has an MLS and the we_.ther
reconnaissance aircraft uert, _es that the PAPI's are visible on the approach from 8K ft to
preflcre and the ball-bar ts visible from preflare tc ftrml flare Th, , tower liratt is allowed
at the TAL or lakebed AOA sites where persistent low altitude/surfa_ e dust or smoke may
greatly restrict the surface visibility, howeuer, may not pose any significant ltmttatLon to
crew "slant range" ulsibdity dumng linal approc_ch to landing This lower surface
visibility can not be applied to sties which are prone to uisibdtty l,mitatlo_3 due to fogor
other transient conditions . ,' . 5 SM limit is the horizontal distance from the runun.y
threshold tbttt correslmnds to the 8K ft attitud," point on the outer glide sial.,," Five SM
utstbili(v :, also tile m;ntmum limit used _sas::es_ ,ng the :,sabdity of an EI,S
Spectftc weather cr terta are pr,,',ided for dec'stons _nu "':.' Ibort l"tp closure or matn
enginel,mitsmanaC.,,mentdurinqascentphas," el. ,L ,met_ *'dtnRuleS-TBErindtts
ra,tonale, in some c,'ts,, hJlowln'; 5iSME lr.ll_. ,e. main engtr.e h ntis .Ml be enabled at the
earliest _tngle.er the ,'apaod'tv to reac? (t pt tree FAL or augmented contingency landing
site [._.CLS ) {,iti,, ling, 1 s L gut'tar.ce, el,cat tk. _ugh the sit, itself may not be a program-
recognized TAL site) i'or ;_q our_:, '. weather ,'rttel w ma) be relaxed, depending on
landing aids statt, s at the selected site. ts a trade,.H ,o preclude exposure to SSME hmits-
Inhibited tl_ratto t for arty longer tha., necess_tr? In th_s _¢ua¢t,ln. it ts considered less
risky :o atte "apt a landing .vtth t_,tentiallv zero,zero conditmns than to continue hm its.
_nhtb_ted SNME _t_'rat;on. prov,b'd that bath TA('A N and MLS are at'ndabl ; at the
large, ted site If the _tte has only rn operatt,,nol TA('AN, hou et_er, the name ceiltn_ and
t,isibtltty restrwtlons art, apphed _s ,6_rorb_t ent;'y pl,a_e ELS GO NO-GO t_'cisions In
the case of abort Rap elo., are, a _s itkett,tse considered r..a:_onable to attempt landing at a
site Ii'llh relattuetv .t_)or it.father ¢'_lq_tli/_rlS as [i)?lIJa,__he att,'mpt rtlrrles a reasonable
prob_lbtltty _[sut'ces,_. when th,. ,'lt.,rnattee _ ;,t u_, ;.'red ditching st:uatmn
THIS RULE IS CONTINUED ON IHE NEXT PAGE
ALL FINAL 5/9/88 TRAJECTORY, GUIDANCE 4-55
NISSION REV DATE SECTION PAGE NO.
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4-64 LANDINGSITE WEATHERCRITERIA - Continued
(cont)
13. SURFACEWIND lIMITS (DAYLIGHT LANDINGS):
1. THE SURFACEWIND LIMITS FOR ALL LANDINGSITES ARE AS
FOLLOWS:
a. HEADWIND: _ 25 KTS
). TAILWIND: <_10 KTS
c. CROSSWIND: <_.12 KTS
NOTE: SURFACE WIND LIMITS REPRESENT PEAK WINDS, INCLUDING
MAXIMUM GUSTS (GUSTS I,_JSTBE $ B KTS ABOVE THE
AVERAGE WIND)
2. WITH ONE APU FAILED, SJRFACE LIMIT3 CHANGE AS FOLLOWS:
a. CROSSWIND s 10 KTS
b. NOT GREATER THAN LIGHT TURBULENCE
This table represents the not to beexceede ' flmzts for wind comp_n*nts for the various
landing site_ Headwind hmlts ore est_bhshed to ensure the Orbiter will land on the run-
way with touchdown margin Tmlu'lnds a elect the loading by cousin8 longer touchdown
ranges, lOSSof roK'mt margtn, and htgher _,rake energy Crosswtnd hmlts are based upon
Orblter lateral cont,ol and ftre tL_ear The llmit of l2 KT peak crossaand corresponds to
the point where the L,ehlcleImndhng quahties becomes marginal based on A rues VMS
simulations Gusts of grev.ter th,anS KT ahoue the auerage.steady state tt'lnd correspond4
to the i .sigma _stattst.cal wind profde data. Shuttle Meteorological Group !SMG _.Entry
FTP 42. deviation for the maximum pet_kwmd allnwable (RSS of the peak
hea&'c_osswlnd llmlt_ ' The h roll ol _- 8 KT a_aschosen in order to pratect for the
statistical gust factor( 1.s_gma; that reerhc_ the headwind, cros_u,tnd hmtts
For one A"t_"faded, the Orb ter s ono failure at.,ab f-am hat,lag o _.ss of turn APt "'s at
touchdown With tu,_ APU'r down. the uehwle wdl have reduced flight control authority
"_)_sof hydraulic power, braking, and nt,se wheel stem,ring In _rrler to protect from this
possible toss of control authority, croswind peak hm_ts are s,'lat I0 KT jhr all runways
Great" than light :urhuler.,-e Is not allowed for the same con_rol los_ retzsorl_
THIS RULZ IS CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE
i ALL FIMAL 5/9/88 "IRAJECTORY,GUIDANCE 4-56
| NISSIO.'W REI DATE SECTION PAGE NO.
72
- JOHIL?OgSPACECENTER
FLIGHT RULES
R RULE
4-64 LANDING SITE WEATHER CRITERIA - Continued
(Cant)
Gusts. peak winds obove the steady state or oueruge wind. are lirt_lted to S KT This 8 KT
limit was derwed from stot_stwal data whwh indwated that when a 17 KT auerage wind
is present, the peak wind or gust is _25 KT (our headwl nd limit/
Loss of one AI- U tnuokes a crosswmd ond turbul:nce restrwtlon Thts port of the rule l_
,near.: to protect the Orbiter for the loss of a second APU With two APU's down. the
Orbiter wdl h_t'e reduced flight control, braking and nose" wheel steering capability
J, efer to paragraph E for art explanatwn of the turbulence criteria. )
C. SUN ANGLE LIMIT: SUN ON FINAL NOT WITHIN 10 OEG IN AZIMUTH AND
0 TO 20 OEG ELEVATION.
These criteria was established to preclude the S m from oSstructlng the crew's ulswn an
final approach
O. PRECIPITATION AND THUNDERSTORM CRITERIA:
i. PRECIPITATION IS NOT ACCEPTABLE AT THE SURFACE OR ALOFT IN
THE PROXIMITY OF THE ORBITER (SEE BELOW). PRECIPITATION
INDICATIONS !NCLUDE ANY OF THE FOLLOWING:
a. VISIBLE RAIN OR VIRGA
b. PRECIPITATION ECHO ON WEATHER RADAR
c. CLOUD TYPES: CUMULONIMBUS OR CUMULUS CONGESTUS
(TOWERING CUMULUS).
The Orblt,'r Is not to encounter precipitation on any' approach due to decreased t'lsl blllty
and potential damage to the TP.¢, Ent'tronmental design requirements for the Orbiter
were based on the at oidance of to -/7,ght penetration of thunderstorms I ref appendtz
lO-IO, uol X. Spare Shuttle Letel II Program Specl_catlon_ Undesirable aspects of
thunder._torms include rain rTP.¢, structl_re_, had f TPS. structure, control;, severe wind
she_r ¢structure _.turhuler.ce :control, performance, structure _.and r,atural or triggered
hghlnJng (strlzrlure, eleclr _ni¢ ,calla,arc s._slems)
A 10 n mt horl:(,ah:[ l_roxlmity distance u,os chosen I_lsed on research experience to
minlm4ze rl_ tr [t_eto lightning, turbulence, and wind shear and to include _)recast
_ncertairlticx
THIS RULE TS CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE
ALL FINAL 5/9/88 TRAJECTORY, GUIDANCE 4-57
NISSION REV OATE SECTION PAGE NO_
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4..64 LANDING SITE WEATHER CRITERIA - Continued
(Cont
2. THUNDERSTORM PROXIMITY (PRE-DEORBIT AND PRELAUNCH AOA): A
SITE WILL BE NO-GO FOR LANDING IF THE THUNDERSTORM
(INCLUDINGANVIL), LIGHTNING, OR PRECIPI:ATIO_IIS WITHIN 30
NM OF THE LANDING SITE. VERTICAL CLEARANCE FROM THESE
PHENOMENA, AT THE 30 NM RANGE, MUST BE GREATER THAN 2 NM.
ADDITIONALLY, DEIACH£_ OPAQUE THUNDERSTORM ANVILS MUST NOT
BE WITHIN 20 NM OF THE LANDING SITE, NOR WITHIN I0 NM OF
THE APPROACH PATH O_T TO A RANGE OF 30 NM.
For predeorbit or prelauneh AOA d,'cisions ego to 125 m4aforecast _.the 30 n mi
clearance approximates the range to the runway tbr straight.in approaches at an (Tltitude
of 60K ft Addihonally. for these weather phenomena jus, outside thw edge ,)f the 31)n mi
radios, at least 2 n mi vertical cle_.rancemust be maintained In order to at'old triggered
lightning
3. THUNDERSTORM PROXIMITY (PRELAUNCH RTLS AND TAt): A SITE
WILL BE NO-GO FOR LANDING IF A THUNDERSTORM (INCLUDING
ANVIL), LIGHTNING, OR PRECIPITATION IS WITHIN 20 NM OF THE
LANDING SITE OR WI,HIN I0 NM OF THE APPROACH PATH TO A
RANGE OF 30 NM. VERTICAL CLEARANCE FROM THESE PHENOMENA
MUST BE GREATER THAN 2 I_MALONG THE BORDER OF THE
HORIZONTAL PROXIMIT¢ BOUNDARY.
I,'arthe pr_,launch R TI.S and TAI, decisions i20 to 40 m inure forecast I. the 20 n mt
radius clearance (q_pr,_xlrnatesa It) n ml distance from each of the approach IIA("s
This acceptable prnalrnlty d;_tanc," is r, duced fi am 30 n ml radius due to tit,. shorter
foreca.gt permd The approach path b(ta,een 20 n ml and30 n m_ must alsa be protected
hylOn r_l
ADDITIONALLY, DETACHED OPAQUE THUNDERSTORM ANVILS MUST NOT
BE WITHIN I0 NM OF THE LANDING SITE, NOR WITHIN 5 NM OF THE
APPROACH PATH OUT TO A RANGE OF 30 NM.
I),'t_wh,'d ,_lqu," thl_nderst,_rm nnt'lts h_l' ; th ; l)Ot_'nllal for t-ill_Ior,'(t hRhtn(ng t_nd
pr,'cipttatt_,n _hoa/(t th : ,Inl'd hc p,'n,'trat°,d ['h,,r..fi_r,'. Ih," pr_llmlt_ _.f f /I,' (}rhtt,'r from
this l,h,'nl,r'i,'na _s I)rlnlarz() (I,.h, rnzln,'(I t_) filr,'ca.:! iltlcertaltql'l I"l)r the t_lI._o-.ql} nll*lijt¢
/'_r,'cu_t. _ /0 ': ml rear,tin u dl h," mizl,lt_lln.'d fr,,,n the ol)/)rooch p,_th and nt_ .f th,'
h,.,hhn_,,,zllgn,.,,,it,',,n.'_t,..20n ,m rlltllt,_/_'ot_rilnli',l?, b',_rth,'2t).t,_.4Om_n_,t;
fi,r,'('ll_t ii,'( t,l,,_:,.. ,'r_ I'ttt[,' ,,!¢_r£1,1 i_ ;_,,t,'i't,',t _r,_unlt Ih,' tll)pr,_,_ch p_tth, heal,'. Ih,'
11) n _lll rallIll> 'rtlt_; the" rl_ nisei _ l,l_ ::, ,_ rat , [,'utam ,' _llont,, th,' [light path
THIS RULE IS CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE
ALL FINAL 5/9/88 TRAJECTORY, GUIDANCE 4-5_
MISS!ON REV DATE SECIION PAGE NO.
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4-64 LANDING SITE WEATHER CRITERIA - Continued l
(Cont) 14. THUNDERSTORM AVOIDANCE AFTER COMMITTED FOR LANDVNG: ADISTANCE OF 5 NM HORIZONTALLY AND 2 NM ABOVE MUST BEMAINTAINED FROM A CUMULONIMBUS CLOUD, ANVIL, OR ANY OIHERCONVECTIVE CLOUD (RAIN SHOWER) WHOSE TOP EXTENDS TO THE
-i0" CELSIUS HEIGHT.
REAL-TIME THUNDERST(IRM AVOIDANCE TECMNIQUES ARE LIMITED TO
RUNWAY/HAC REDESIGNATION.
NOTE: CLEARANCES WILL BE DETERMINED FROM EITHER RADAR
PRECIPITATION ECHOES OR VISUAL OBSERVATIONS.
The post.commitment avoidance clearances (5 n. mi. horizontal. 2 n. mi. vertical) were
selected to reduce impact on energy management resulting from runway redesignation
and maneuvers and at the same time ensure a reasonably low risk of_natural or
triggered lightning strike. Prohibition of penetrating cumulonimbus, cumulus congestus,
and opaque anvils is b !cause of concern for triggered lightning and rain.
Reference: Weather Rules Workshopat JSC/MSFC, Otlober, 1987.
Rule 4-62B, LANDING SITE SELECTION PRIORITIES, references this rule.
E. TURBULENCE: NOT GREATER THAN MODERATE.
Severe turbu_ence is undesirablc due to controllabdt_ v concerns Turbulence information
comes primarily frum aroa pilot reports The pilots" reports follow standard definitions for
the intensity of the turbulence. The aircraft reaction for the different types of turbulence.
as found in the DOD flight information handbook, are defined as follows:
Light turbulence -- turbulence that momentarily causes slight, erratic changes in altitude
and,'or attitude
Moderate turbulence -. turbulence that causes changes in altitude and'or attitude, but
with the aircraft remaining inpositive control at all times
Severe turbulence -- turbulence t,tat causes large, abrupt changes in altitude and_or
attitude It usually causes large t,ar,attons tn tndwated afrspeed Atrcra[t may be
momentarily out of contro'.
THIS RULE IS CONTINUED ON THE NEXT PAGE
ALL FINAL 5/9/88 TRAJECTORY, GUIDANCE 4-59
MISSION REV DATE SECTION PAGE NO.
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4-64 LANDING SITE WEATHER CRITERIA - Contlnued
(Cant)
F. ADDITIONAL NIGHT LANDII;GLIMITS:
I. WHEN AVAILABLE, A WEATHER RECONNAISSANCE AIRCRAFT WILL
PROVIDE A GO/NO-GO RECOMMENDATION FOR THE LIGHT ATTENUATION
OF THE LANDING AIDS AND THE TOUCHDOWN REGION.
2. CROSSWIND LIMIT ;S s tO KTS PEAK WIND FOR ALL NIGHT LANDING
SITES. SURFACE WIND I.IMITSINCLUDEMAXIMUM GUSTS (GUSTS
MUST BE _ _ KTS ABOVE THE AVERAGE WIND)
3. WIND AND ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS MUST NOT REQUIRE USE OF
CLOSE-IN AIMPOINT, EXCEPT WHERE CLOSE-IN AIMPOINT PAPI's
ARE AVAILABLE.
Because the aintpo(nt markings and normal geographic t'isual cues are not visible at
night, light attenuation of the' fan,ling aids and to'.zchdown r_'gion area _hould he
minimal This eualuation of the light attenuation will primarily depend on the weather
reconnaissance' a_rcraft acceptabd_tv observations. If, ,mwever, on aircraft is unavailable,
then c_sibility will be constrained by ground obser',ations following the daylight visibility
hmits
The crosJu,ind lira its are lou,er fi)r ai;;ht landings heco use of the increased cre t, u,arkload
and uislhihty limttatmns beyond the runu;oy edges
A runway r,,eui _,ng the close-in aimpoint is NO-GO unless there Is a PAPI Installed
Without the PAPI, the close-in mmpoint _s not visible at night IFIt Tech I, item 3)
4. FOR LAKEBED LANDINGS WITH ZERO FAULT TOLERANT MLS, MINIMUM
CEILING LIMIT IS 20K FT. (REF. RULE 3-41B, NAVAIDS
PRELAUNCH REQUIREMENTS, MLS).
For l_kehed landmgs ,}t ly _ingl ; ,_trtng MI ,'_ _s acceptable if ceihng._ ar_ greater than
2I)K fl The mrreased eetl_n_ prov_d,,s ,. Jdttmnal t_me for the crew to compensate far
nacigation dL_p_.r_mns u_tr : cr,_'ucd cues In (zddttton the" larger area proctded b)' the
lakebed enc_r¢}nm:'nt mttk,,s nat,tk'atton dL_la,rstons r_'_'_tlti .g from the Fos._ihl . fadure ¢_[
the ,_ingl,,-str_ n¢ Ml.,_ m_re tol,'r(zhle
Roh' 2.1, PRELA I 'N('tl GO NO (;0 Rl'X_l "IREMENTS. reference this r.le
ALL FINAL 5/9/88 TRAJECTORY,GUIOANCE 4-60
MISSION REV DATL SECTION PAGE NO.
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I I I (Coned)
G. WET RUNWAYACCEPTABILITYCONDITIONS
THE FOLLOWINGCONDITIONSWILLNO-GOUSE OF A SPECIFICRUNWAY:
a. HARDSURFACE
I. :TANDINGWATER.
b. LAKEBED
1. MOISTURE/SIANDINGWATER.
2. WET/SLUSHYSURFACEMATERIAL.
3. _JTHOL.ES.
C. ALL SURFACES
I. STRUCTURALFAILURES(BREAKTHROUGH)
2. SNOW/ICE.
NOTE: CONDITIONSARE ASSESSEDOVERTHE ENTIREPREPARED
SURFACEOF RUNWAY
Wet lakebed runways imore than a trace of rain Jare not acceptable d:_e to the possibility of
hydroplaniag and loss of brake effectiveness Due to the large load bearing requirements
of the Orbiter. structural failures are not acceptable on any surface type, Fissures or
cracks which may lead to or be evid, nee of structural failures are not allowable. Wet/
slushy material is not acceptable due to the possibility of Orbiter damage from thrown
surface material ¢ifted up by the tires. Potholes are not acceptable owing tothe possible
tire damage caused hy impact For concrete surfaces, standing water may lead to
hydroplaning conditions_ Snow/ice is not acceptable for any runway surface as loss of
traction results Conditiens are assessed over the entire prepared surface of the runway
due to the uncertainty of where'when standing water may go. Reference Entry FTP 42
Rules 1.35F and d. LANDING SITES: 2-IF. I and 3. LANDING SITE WEATHER
CRITERIA 2-31A and D. EXTENSION .)A Y REQUIREMENTS. 2.81A, EXTEN-
SION DAY GUIDELINES..3-4 IA. LANDING SITE WEATHER CRITERIA :
4-2, LANDING SITE CONDITIONS: 4-26. PERFORMANCE BOUNDARIES:
4 -62B, LANDING SITE SELECTION PRIORITIES: 4-6,5, I)EORBIT PRIORITY FOR
EOM WEATHER: 5.27, LIMIT SllUTDOWN CONTROL: and _-60, GNC GO/NO-GO
CRITERIA. reference this rule,
ALL!"NAL. 2/,/88 TRAJEClORY,GUIOA CEi '-61
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R RULE
4-65 DEORBIT PRIORITY FOR EOM WEAIHLR
FORECAST VIOLATIONS (REF. RULE 4-64, LANDING SITE WEATHER CRITERIA)
AT THE NOMINAL EOM TIME WILL RESULT IN SELECTIONOF ONE OF THE
FOLLOWINGOPTIONS LISTED IN ORDER OF PRIORITY:
A. DEORBIT TO PLS AT NOMINAL EOM TIME OR ONE ORBIT LATE TO ALTER-
NATE RUNWAYS (IF REQUIRED FOR WINDS, SUN ANGLE, OR ISOLATED
CLOUD COVERAGE).
B. DEORBIT TO PLS EARLY ON EOM DAY.
C. DEORBIT TO PLS DAILY OPPORTUNITY.
O. DEORBIT TO PLS 24 HRS LATE.
E. DEORBIT TO SLS AT NOMINAL EOM TIME.
F. RELAX WEATHER CRITERIA.
Deorbit to the primary landing site is always desircLble due to conuoy/ground operations
support and crew familiarity. Options I to 4 provide a priority list af options to deorbit to
the primary landing site, Should it not be possible to deorbit to the 2rimary site. the
secondary landing site will be _tilized (option 5), Weather criteria will be relaxed real
time should 5oth the primary and secondary landing sites be unacceptable.
Rule 2-200, CONTINGENCY ACTION SUMMARY, references this rule.
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